The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by the International Court of Justice by Perez, Antonio F.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
1997 
The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention 
by the International Court of Justice 
Antonio F. Perez 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anotnio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by the International 
Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 399 (1997). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
THE PASSIVE VIRTUES AND THE WORLD
COURT: PRO-DIALOGIC ABSTENTION BY
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Antonio F. Perez*
INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AS AN ANALOGY TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ICJ .......... 399
I. A PARADIGM CASE FOR PRUDENTIAL ABSTENTION-
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA AND STANDING ............ 410
II. ABSTENTION IN THE ABSENCE OF NECESSARY PARTIES-
THE PASSAGE FROM THE CORFU CHANNEL TO THE
T IM OR G AP ............................................... 4 15
III. ABSTENTION IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRILOGY ......... 424
A. Law of the Case and Mootness Redux-
New Zealand v. France ............................... 424
B. Speciality and the Request of the World Health
Organization (WHO)-An Anti-Delegation Doctrine .... 426
C. Non-Liquet and the Request of the General Assembly for an
Advisory Opinion-The Political Question Doctrine as
the Absence of Manageable Judicial Standards ........ 429
1. N on-Liquet ....................................... 430
2. Separation of Powers and Federalism ............. 437
3. Moral Questions and Political Answers ............ 439
C ONCLUSIONS ................................................ 443
INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS AN
ANALOGY TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ICJ
Some thirty-five years ago, Alexander Bickel recognized that the
United States Supreme Court in exercising its power to review the
constitutionality of acts of Congress could do not two, but three, things.
* Associate Professor, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America,
1993-. J.D., Columbia University (1985); A.B., Harvard College (1982). I would like to thank
Steve Suk, Columbus School of Law, 1997, for outstanding research assistance and the
Catholic University of America for funding the research that made this article possible. I
would also like to thank Marshall Breger, Robert Destro, Michael Reisman, Oscar Schachter,
and Geoff Watson for reading and commenting on earlier versions.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Not only could, the Court validate or invalidate statutes; it could also
definitively refuse to do either.' In Bickel's view, the reasons the Court
might fail to discharge its constitutionally prescribed duty to exercise
jurisdiction in "all" cases and controversies "within its competence ' 2
reflected the inevitable tension between law and politics. A decision by
a court to legitimize or delegitimize a decision by a political organ must
be based on principle. By contrast, politics necessarily involves pruden-
tial judgments.3 In making such judgments, the Court might legitimately
consider its own institutional self-preservation, and if necessary to
maintain its credibility as a non-political institution, make pragmatic
judgments regarding the best means for implementing constitutional
principles. Yet, many found this version of the Bickelian insight deeply
1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 69 (1962).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States;---between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. Justice Marshall's formulation in Cohens v. Virginia is canonical:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it
is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as
the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the
Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts,
with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be
brought before us.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
3. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 70. Bickel's distinction is not, however, like Ronald
Dworkin's later distinction between deontological and teleological modes of reasoning.
Dworkin distinguishes between "principles," as standards of judgment derived from morality
that are independent of the particular social outcome advanced, and "policies," as standards of
judgment that further some particular good. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUS-
LY 22 (1978); cf. INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 381-88 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994)(distinguishing positivism and natural law). Although even Dworkin concedes that the two
concepts can be collapsed in a range of cases, Bickel's "prudential" exercise of judgment to
advance "principles" treats the "principles" to be advanced as though they were, in Dworkin's
usage, mere "policies." See DWORKIN, supra, at 23. This reading of Bickel's conception of
"principle" is consistent with Bickel's fundamentally positivist concern, expressed in his
exegesis of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," with the need for consent. See generally
BICKEL, supra note 1, at 16-28 (discussing the role of "principle" in judicial review). Thus, to
the extent Bickel argues for pragmatism in the service of principle, he should not be misun-
derstood to advance, like Dworkin, an argument for "principle" based on non-positivist
jurisprudential premises.
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problematic, for it suggested a kind of Platonic Guardianship4 that might
entail the convenient, yet corrupting, lie that the Court is above poli-
tics-much like the so-called "noble lie" Plato's Guardians would tell
the hoi polloi of the Guardian's superiority. 5 Thus corrupted, the Court
would be free to impose its own view of the Constitution over an equal-
ly, if not more, plausible interpretation of a coordinate branch.
Nonetheless, argued Bickel, the U.S. Supreme Court could, and
should, refrain from exercising its jurisdiction by using "an almost inex-
haustible arsenal of techniques and devices," including far more than the
political question doctrine. Bickel asserted the legitimacy of declining
jurisdiction because these methods are "quite properly called techniques
for eliciting answers, since so often they engage the Court in a Socratic
colloquy with the other institutions of government and with society as a
whole concerning the necessity for this or that measure, for this or that
compromise."6 In so doing, the Supreme Court need not abandon the
project of principled government;7 rather, Bickel's hope was to preserve
the Court to perform its "grand function" of making possible "principled
government."'8 More important, by abstaining, the Court might spur the
political branches to make prudential judgments that better accord with
the principles articulated by the Court as it deferred adjudicating the
merits of disputes.9 In short, although others have dismissed Bickel's
methods as an unprincipled surrender to expediency, 0 he may plausibly
4. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958), discussed in BICKEL, supra note 1,
at 46-49.
5. See PLATO'S REPUBLIC, Bk. Ill (I.A. Richards ed. and trans., 1966); see also I.F.
STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 166-68 (1989) (describing the "noble lie" as the "dark side
of Plato's utopia").
6. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 70-71.
7. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959), discussed in BICKEL, supra note 1, at 49-51.
8. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 71.
9. In articulating this central rationale for abstention, Bickel recalled Thayer's rule of
clear mistake in constitutional adjudication, which Thayer defended in part on the ground that
deference to the legislature would encourage correction through the political process, thereby
promoting public participation in that process. See id. at 21-22 (quoting from J.B. Thayer's
biography of John Marshall). This representation reinforcing rationale for abstention from
judicial review has also been employed to justify judicial review itself in cases where
structural or other defects preclude effective functioning of the political process. See, e.g.,
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75-88 (1980)
(explaining the jurisprudence of the Carolene Products footnote, and modem equal protection
law in terms of the permanent inability of "insular minorities" to achieve membership in
governing coalitions, United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
10. See, e.g., Leslie Pickering Francis, Law and Philosophy: From Skepticism to Value
Theory, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 65, 76 (1993) (stating that Bickel's "passive virtues" allowed
the Court to withhold "ultimate constitutional judgment" from "cases that it was not institu-
tionally suited to decide, even when a principled rationale was available for the decision");
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be read to argue that abstention should be employed to catalyze a rea-
soned dialogue among the people, the original sources of constitutional
value, and the people's agents, the political branches of government.
Furthermore, this dialogue would further the application of constitutional
principles to concrete cases and, in so doing, clarify and progressively
develop constitutional values." Thus, Bickel's Court was not packed
with Socratic philosophers who loved constitutional principles for their
abstact quality. Rather, the Bickelian judge saw principles in light of the
"historically conditioned complexities of actual institutions."' 2 And, in
Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Vrtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964) (arguing that "Bickel's
'virtues" are 'passive' in name and appearance only" and that "a virulent variety of free-
wheeling interventionism lies at the core of his devices of restraint"); Louis Henkin, Is There
a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 623 (1976) (reasoning that, in the
context of the political question doctrine, if the court had to reach the merits of the question
presented to it, it would at least be required "to consider ... an allegation that the political
branches have acted unconstitutionally); Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the
Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595, 614 (1987) (The political question doctrine
is "more easily demonstrated to be nonexistent than any other nonjustiability doctrine.");
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question Doctrine", 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1031, 1033, 1043-55 (1985) (critiquing Bickel's reasons for the passive virtue embodied in
the political question doctrine and concluding that those reasons are flawed because "its
moral, social, and political costs outweigh its speculative benefits"); Sanford Levinson,
Strategy, Jurisprudence, and Certiorari, 79 VA. L. REV. 717, 720 (1993) (reviewing H.W.
PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (1991)) (summarizing Bickel's "passive virtues" as an endorsement of the "Court's
exercise of self-conscious political judgment in dodging certain issues when [the Court]
perceived that the political costs of a visible decision might be too high"); Cass R. Sunstein,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 n.8 (1996) (distinguishing
himself from Bickel on the basis that he considers the legislature, not the Court, "the central
deliberative institution," while Bickel, who "fear[ed] ... political backlash," considered the
Court "the basic repository of principle in American government").
.11. See, e.g., Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some
Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 201-02 (1969)
(stating that Bickel's "passive virtues" are "maxims of political jurisprudence" defining the
"terms of the 'colloquy' between the Court and the other agencies of government"); Anthony
T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1586-87 (1985)
(explaining that this "conversation ... regarding matters of principle ... may help the Court
itself to a better understanding of the issues involved and a better resolution of them"); Robert
F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question
Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 652, 655 (1989) (reading Bickel to hold that "delay and
avoidance were not technical devices at the margin of the judicial function" but were rather
"methods by which the error of abstraction could be prevented"; that judges who are forced
"to listen when the timing or issue was wrong would only lead to unfortunate decisions on
the merits"; and that it was better to avoid deciding on the merits rather than "to stunt
political discourse"); Kenneth Ward, Alexander Bickel's Theory of Judicial Review Reconsid-
ered, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 893, 908 (1996) (arguing that Bickel's "passive virtues" allow the
Court to "contribute to citizens' political education by engaging in a colloquy with elected
institutions and the public").
12. Kronman, supra note 11, at 1590. Kronman notes that "[b]y offering a partial or
reversible solution to a constitutional problem, a solution that bespeaks its own uncertainty
regarding the principle or principles involved, the Court invites the other branches of govern-
ment, and the public, to rise to a consideration of principle and address the problem in the
[Vol. 18:399
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shedding light on this melange of principle and practice, the Supreme
Court would play the part of dialogic ringmaster.
What has this to do with the International Court of Justice (ICJ)?
The World Court's jurisdiction over "cases" extends only to "all cases
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force."' 3
Thus, the ICJ's jurisdiction is much more limited than the U.S. Supreme
Court's.14 Nonetheless, it is increasingly plausible to treat the U.N.
Charter as a constitution for an emerging constitutional community in
which the Secretary-General, Security Council, and General Assembly
represent states, peoples, and sub- or trans-national interests. 5 Bickelian
questions now seem ripe for analysis in the jurisprudence of the World
Court. It is worth asking, in those cases where the ICJ does have juris-
same spirit." Il at 1587, n.84 (citing Professor Burt's "dialogic conception" of the Supreme
Court's role. Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE
L.J. 455 (1984)).
13. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 36, para. 1. In addition,
States that are parties to the Statute may:
at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
I at art. 36, para. 2.
14. This is not to ignore the theoretical power, under Article III of the U.S. Constitution,
of the Congress to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by "exceptions and
regulations." See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
SYSTEM 362-68, 377-82, 384-87 (1988) (discussing the limits to the "exceptions and
regulations" clause). It is simply that this power exists more in theory than in fact; thus, it is
an insufficient basis to collapse the difference between the general jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and the more limited jurisdiction of the ICJ.
15. See generally Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum: The Reconstruction Of
Article 2(7) and Rise Of Federalism Under the United Nations Charter, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J.
353, 355-57, 384-98 (1996) (proposing that the decline of the non-intervention principle in
international law suggests the emergence of a supranational constitution supporting the
interests of the supranational community); but see Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council
Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 58 (1994)
(arguing that enforcement action by the Council is merely "one form of countermeasures
undertaken on the basis of a collective and institutionalised decision of an international
organisation, in the defence of fundamental community interests, as distinct from those
'horizontal' reactions taken by an injured State or States within a bilateral context"); Matthias
J. Herdegen, The "Constitutionalization" of the UN Security System, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 135 (1994) (questioning the utility of the constitutional model for assessing
the scope of the ICJ's power to review the decisions of the Security Council).
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diction, does the ICJ have a "duty to decide," and if so, should it ever
be able to avoid that duty, or at least delay its performance.
On one hand, scholars who have been called "legalists" argue that
the ICJ, despite its "duty to decide," has failed, thus far, to check ade-
quately the Security Council's exercise of its power under the U.N.
Charter. On the other, scholars who have been called "realists" maintain
that the ICJ has, if anything, transgressed its legitimate domain by
suggesting that it does have the power to review the decisions of the
political organs of the United Nations. 16 In a sense, the World Court
legalists are the heirs of Herbert Wechsler's insistence on neutral princi-
ples of judicial review, while World Court realists share Learned Hand's
fear of rule by an unaccountable judiciary 7 even if, unlike their Su-
preme Court brethren, the judges of the ICJ are untenured and, thus,
politically accountable. 8
Given the recent outpouring of law-making activity by the Security
Council, yet a third, neo-Bickelian view has emerged, arguing that the
ICJ will not be able to avoid passing on the legality of Security Council
action and that the only question is how the ICJ will exercise its power
of review. 19 This third view suggests that the ICJ should act in an
"expressive" mode, drawing from American constitutional law scholar-
ship observing that the U.S. Supreme Court articulates its ideal vision of
the U.S. Constitution as an aspirational document.20 The ICJ would then
not only "cue" a coordinate body such as the Security Council as to
16. See Jose Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2, n.5 (1996).
Alvarez describes a debate whose leading advocates are, on one side, legalist Thomas Franek
and, on the other side, realist Michael Reisman. Compare Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers
of Appreciation": Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519
(1992), with W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 83 (1993). According to Alvarez, these scholars have engaged in a misplaced debate,
since assessing the Court's exercise of its review function requires first identifying an
appropriate theory of governance that will be implemented by the ICJ's intervention in law-
making through judicial review. See Alvarez, supra, at 18.
17. Cf. supra note 16. An additional point as suggested to me by Michael Reisman is
that, even if the Supreme Court's understanding of the domestic political process might on
occasion justify its performance of a law-prescribing function, it is doubtful that ICJ judges
could claim sufficient knowledge of the international political process to do so.
18. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 13, para. 1 ("The
members of the Court shall be elected [by the Security Council and General Assembly] for
nine years and may be re-elected .... ). For some, this might make the judges of the ICJ
problematic for the counter-Bickelian reason that, because they are subject to political
pressure, the justice they dispense is instinctually unprincipled. See generally Steven P.
Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 689 (1995) (discussing the problems associated with an elected judiciary).
19. See Alvarez, supra note 16, at 20-24.
20. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 219(1982) (discussing the expressive function of the Supreme Court).
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limits it should internalize in the exercise of its powers but also "'shape
[the] people's vision of their Constitution and of themselves.' ,,21
The expressive mode of review by the ICJ seems to track partially
the Bickelian insight that policymaking by courts seems most legitimate
when it conforms to principle and furthers the project of principled
government. What it fails to account for, however, is the need to bal-
ance the ICJ's "grand" responsibility with the accommodation of pru-
dential judgments made by the U.N.'s political organs in response to the
needs of the moment. Only an "arsenal of techniques and devices" for
abstention will allow the ICJ to perform its expressive function in a way
that allows it to refrain from interventions that tend to undercut transna-
tional political processes. Thus, in discharging its "duty to decide"
contentious cases and in rendering advisory opinions prematurely or
immodestly,22 the ICJ may well end constitutional dialogues even before
they have commenced, condemning itself to irrelevancy and thus mak-
ing its voice merely "sound and fury / [s]ignifying nothing. '23 Or it
might well succeed in its goals of principled government, but only
through elite consensus in its Platonic Guardianship, and perhaps
through a coalition with one of the coordinate political organs.24 In
short, transnational democracy requires a machinery for abstention to
facilitate an exercise of the expressive mode of review that fulfills not
only the ICJ's "grand" function of furthering principled government but
also principled government's alloyed promise to respect only the values
"constitutionalized" through the transnational political process.
Some commentators, however, have not found machinery for absten-
tion in the ICJ Statute's text or negotiating history,25 much as Justice
21. Alvarez, supra note 16, at 30-31 (quoting BOBBITT, supra note 20, at 193).
22. As Learned Hand suggested in a different context, "[tihe spirit of liberty is the spirit
which is not too sure that it is right." LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 190 (3d ed. 1960).
23. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5, lines 27-28 (Nicholas Brooke ed.,
Clarendon Press 1990) (1606).
24. The Court is not unaware of the role it can play in legitimizing action by the
,Security Council. Its former President, Mohammed Bedjaoui, has noted that the Court can
"assure 'the peoples' [of the world] when it is sought to mobilize them through world
opinion, that there is nothing pernicious about the action contemplated by the Security
Council." Mohammed Bedjaoui, Introduction: On the Efficacy of International Organizations:
Some Variations on an Inexhaustible Theme, in TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION BY
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 7, 26 (Niels Blokker & Sam Muller eds., 1994). This power
may well be abused by the ICJ when, as some have argued, the ICJ acts in an unprincipled
way to further the purposes of the political organs of the U.N., such as by giving effect to
U.N. resolutions adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, whose purpose was to
interfere with ongoing litigation before the Court. See, e.g., Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, 50-71 (Apr. 14) (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
25. See Edward Gordon, Legal Disputes Under Article 36(2) of the Statute, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 183 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987)
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Marshall failed initially to find discretion in the U.S. Supreme Court's
exercise of its powers of review.6 This article argues that the ICJ's
jurisprudence includes a settled subsequent practice 27 of prudential
abstention that, with the increase in legislative activity by the political
organs of the U.N., will become more important to the Court's exercise
of its functions. This is particularly so because of the increase in the
probability of conflicts between the U.N. and individual States, generat-
ing issues that might be described under the broad label of international
federalism,2" as well as increasing conflicts between the two preeminently
[hereinafter Legal Disputes]; Edward Gordon, Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v.
United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 129 (1987) (arguing that use of the term "legal
dispute" in Article 36(2) provides no basis for limiting the jurisdiction of the Court in conten-
tious cases in terms of either whether a "dispute" exists or whether, if there is a dispute, it is
a "legal" dispute). But see SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT 292, n.l (2d rev. ed. 1985).
26. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 69.
27. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention's norms are reflected also in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543, which would set forth the
applicable treaty interpretation rules governing an issue involving a multilateral treaty such as
the ICJ Statute. These rules of treaty interpretation are also widely regarded as binding custom-
ary international law. See Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970). However, it might seem more fruitful to ground an interpretation
of the Statute of the ICJ, as an instrument central to the operation of the Charter, in the quasi-
constitutional mode of analysis that seems more appropriate for Charter analysis. See Louis B.
SOHN, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED NATIONS & SOUTH AFRICA (1994); see also Perez,
supra note 15, at 373-96 (arguing that constitutional, rather than treaty interpretation, should
account for stability and change in the United Nations Charter). But whatever model is
employed, the practice of the ICJ is sufficient to outweigh the relative paucity of evidence
derived from its text and negotiating history.
28. Drawing on the experience of the U.S. Supreme Court, commentators have recognized
the ICJ case law's potential role in "forging and maintaining an effective federal system."
Richard Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of International Adjudication, in
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 25, at 155, 158, n.13(reporting suggestion of Professor Thomas Franck). Similarly, in constructing federalism-based
doctrines of international judicial restraint, one might well draw on Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 46 (1971), in which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to adjudicate, citing "the
fundamental policy against federal interference in state criminal prosecutions." Justice Black
argued that "Our Federalism" represents:
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious through it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeav-
ors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of
the States.
Id at 44. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 52, 52A (5th ed.
1994) (discussing Younger v. Harris, as well as other doctrines founded on federalism and
related concerns under which federal courts abstain).
[Vol. 18:399
The Passive Virtues and'the World Court
political organs of the U.N., the Security Council and General Assembly,
raising what might be called separation of powers issues.29
Does this mean that there is an international "political question
doctrine," under which the ICJ decides not to exercise jurisdiction
because of separation of powers considerations? Admittedly, the World
Court explicitly denied the existence of a "political question" doctrine
based on separation of powers in the Nicaragua Case.3 Nonetheless, the
ICJ has employed an "arsenal of techniques and devices" performing the
same function as such a doctrine but under other names. Much as Bickel
described these techniques as alternatives along a continuum of absten-
tion in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court,3' the ICJ has, in
exercising its powers of review without invoking a distinct political
question doctrine, abstained in ways that perform the same function as
the political question doctrine.
In one respect, however, the Bickelian approach to understanding the
ICJ's exercise of its power of judicial review may be misleading.
Bickel's version of the machinery of abstention dealt only with conten-
tious cases, given the limit of the jurisdiction of U.S. courts only to
concrete cases and controversies. 32 Accordingly, the building blocks for
the Bickelian machinery of abstention derive from Frankfurter's common
law faith that "[e]very tendency to deal with constitutional questions
abstractly... to formulate them in terms of barren legal questions, leads
to dialectics, to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. 33 These
concepts may well be relevant to the ICJ's exercise of jurisdiction in
contentious cases where, in addition to the requirement of acceptance of
the ICJ's subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the ICJ Statute further
29. See discussion infra Part III.C. But see Gordon, Legal Disputes, supra note 25, at 183,
202 (arguing there is no justification for a justiciability doctrine to prevent the ICJ from
deciding cases because "checks and balances [are] written into the structure of government that
the Constitution--but not the Charter or Statute--creates").
30. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 433-35
(Nov. 26) (rejecting a separation of powers rationale advanced by the United States under
which the ICJ would be barred from reviewing questions of international peace and security
that are "textually committed" to the Security Council under the U.N. Charter). See also Oscar
Schachter, Disputes Involving the Use of Force, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT
A CROSSROADS, supra note 25, at 223, 238-39 (endorsing the ICJ's rejection of an international
political question doctrine, although recognizing that "the question of the propriety of judicial
abstention in these kinds of cases does not lend itself to categorical answers. It is a delicate
and complex problem on which reasonable persons can well differ.").
31. See BICKEL, supra note 1, ch. IV passim.
32. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 113-118 (discussing Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas 409
(1792), and the episode in 1793 known as the Correspondences of the Justices, setting forth the
doctrine that the U.S. Supreme Court does not render advisory opinions).
33. Felix Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1,
475, 478 (1930) (quoted in BICKEL, supra note 1, at 115-16).
Spring 19971
Michigan Journal of International Law
requires that the dispute be a "legal disput[e]."34 Accordingly, the ICJ has
fashioned limiting doctrines on the exercise of its jurisdiction under the
rubric of admissibility, such as standing and the absence of a necessary
third party,35 that it has used to abstain in the Bickelian mode.36 Howev-
er, drawing in part from constitutional traditions in civil law countries
that are more open to abstract review37-that is, the exercise of judicial
review in the absence of an actual case or controversy involving discrete
facts to which the challenged legislative act is applied3 8-the ICJ's
jurisdiction also extends to the issuance of advisory opinions. Although
the ICJ's jurisdiction to render advisory opinions requested by the United
Nations' Security Council or General Assembly, or their delegees, is
nominally discretionary,39 the ICJ nonetheless has taken the view that it
should ordinarily grant requests that it give advisory opinions. 40 Yet even
34. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, para. 2; see also
ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1946-1996, at 127, 138-39
(1996) (quasi-official history prepared by the Chief Librarian of the Registry of the Court). The
ICJ's predecessor had defined "a dispute" as "a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a
conflict of legal views or interests between two persons." Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions,
1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11 (Aug. 30).
35. See EYFFINGER, supra note 34, at 138-39.
36. See discussion infra notes 43-57 (discussing standing) and 67-109 (noting the indis-
pensable party doctrine). But see Gordon, Legal Disputes, supra note 25, at 198-202 (arguing
that the concept of "legal dispute" is non-discretionary).
37. See, e.g., Alec Stone, Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western
Europe, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 41 (Donald W. Jackson & C.
Neal Tate eds., 1992) (discussing receptivity of civil law systems to abstract review). Unlike
civil law countries, which in some cases permit abstract review at the request of less than a
majority of the members of the legislative b6dy, id. at 45, the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ
requires a request by the Security Council, the General Assembly, or by an organ or special-
ized agency authorized to do so by the General Assembly. See U.N. CHARTER art. 96;
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 65. Arguably, the advisory jurisdic-
tion is thus protected from the politicization that might follow its use to continue a policy
debate initially lost by a legislative minority, as is apparently often the case in abstract review
under civilian constitutional systems. See Stone, supra, at 54-55 (resulting in the diminished
legitimacy for the reviewing body, particularly in the French case, where the inaccurately
named French Constitutional Court functions as an additional legislative chamber).
38. See Stone, supra note 37, at 42.
39. Article 65(1) of the Statute of the ICJ provides: "The Court may give an advisory
opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request." STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 65, para. I. The ICJ has described Article 65(1) not
as an "enabling" provision but rather as one that "leaves a discretion as to whether or not it
will give an advisory opinion that has been requested of it, once it has established its compe-
tence to do so." Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
809, 818 [hereinafter Request of General Assembly] (advisory opinion of ICJ responding to
request made by the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session).
40. The Court stated its views, in language it has repeated again and again: "The Court's
Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ which is entitled to request it; the reply of
the Court, itself an 'organ of the United Nations', represents its participation in the activities
of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused." Interpretation of Peace Treaties
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 71 (Mar. 30).
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in its advisory opinions, the Court has developed tools for declining to
answer and, if need be, answering in a way that itself poses questions for
a considered judgment of the transnational political process.
This article will describe how the World Court has abstained in a
way that not only expresses its commitment to principled government but
also implements a coordinate, participation-inducing agenda. The article
argues that the most recent jurisprudence of the ICJ manifests an acceler-
ation of this tendency in response not only to the need to conserve
judicial resources in light of the increased use of the Court by States,1
but also, and more significantly, to the enhanced law-making activity of
the political organs of the U.N.42
Part I will discuss the ICJ's engagement in the South-West Afri-
ca/Namibia cases as a model for the role it must now undertake. In
particular, it describes the ICJ's use of the standing doctrine. Part II turns
to the ICJ's recent jurisprudence concerning the status of East Timor,
which may well represent the early stages of a dialogue not unlike the
one stimulated by the ICJ's opinions concerning Namibia. Specifically,
it describes the ICJ's use of a version of the "necessary party" concept.
Part III turns to a recent trilogy of nuclear weapons cases, both conten-
tious and advisory opinions, in which the ICJ discharged both its "grand"
responsibility to articulate principles and its "dialogic" function of
stimulating constitutional debate at the political level. It describes how
the ICJ employed techniques of abstention relating to law of the case,
delegation, and vagueness to avoid undercutting an emerging constitu-
tional debate in the transnational community over the status of nuclear
weapons. In sum, in the nuclear weapons opinions, the ICJ found that
either the wrong party was present, the right party was absent, or that the
wrong issue was litigated. The article concludes that the ICJ's increasing
use of this "arsenal of devices" is a necessary and welcome phenomenon
provided, however, that the ICJ in exercising its power to abstain con-
tinues both to fulfill its "grand" responsibility to articulate principle and
discharge its Socratic obligation to stimulate reasoned dialogue.
41. See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. General List No. 93 (July 8, 1996) at para. 31 [hereinafter Request of the
World Health Organization (WHO)] (separate opinion of Judge Oda); see also Keith Highet,
Comment, The Peace Palace Heats Up: The World Court in Business Again?, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 646, 654 (1991) ("[T]he Court, like a phoenix, appears to have emerged from the ashes of
Nicaragua.").
42. See Alvarez, supra note 16, at 20-24.
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I. A PARADIGM CASE FOR PRUDENTIAL ABSTENTION- SOUTH-
WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA AND STANDING
The South-West Africa cases involved both requests for advisory
opinions and contentious cases over nearly a twenty-year period. At each
step of the way, the ICJ articulated principle and posed questions for
response by the international political community. Initially, the ICJ faced
the question of the survival of the mandate created under the League of
Nations under which South Africa had undertaken responsibilities to
govern the then non-self-governing territory of South-West Africa (later
Nambia) for the benefit of its inhabitants. South Africa's obligations
were held to subsist, notwithstanding the dissolution of the League of
Nations and South Africa's refusal to enter into a trusteeship agreement
with the United Nations as successor to the League.43 A few years later,
by validating the General Assembly's decision to establish a procedure
to grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters relating to the mandate,
the ICJ confirmed the General Assembly's power to supervise the
continued implementation of the mandate. These powers were held to
include the right not only to exercise the exact degree of supervision
actually exercised by the League during its existence, but also if the
General Assembly so chose to exercise whatever powers the League may
have had by virtue of the mandate. This interpretation enabled the Gener-
al Assembly more effectively to determine the compliance of South
Africa with its international obligations." By validating the General
Assembly's capacity to exercise the full powers of supervision inherent
in the mandate, the ICJ opened the door in practical terms for the Gen-
eral Assembly to determine that South Africa had breached the mandate
both in its failure to discharge its responsibilities toward the inhabitants
of the territory and in its disregard of its responsibilities toward the
General Assembly. Accordingly, because the League possessed the power
to terminate the mandate in the event that South Africa materially
breached its obligations, the ICJ's reasoning enabled the General Assem-
bly ultimately to terminate the mandate.45
43. See International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (July 11).
44. See Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South-West Africa,
1956 I.C.J. 23 (June 1).
45. See Vienna Convention, supra note 27, art. 60, para. 1 (material breach of a bilateral
treaty, in this case between the League and United Kingdom and their successors, respectively,
the General Assembly and the Republic of South Africa, giving rise to the right of the non-
breaching party to terminate).
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Yet, because the ICJ reasoned from the premise that the mandate was
a treaty whose obligations subsisted notwithstanding the dissolution of
the League of Nations, the door also was left open for States, as parties
themselves to the League and the mandates created thereunder, to assert
directly what legal rights they might have concerning South Africa's
performance of its obligations. Liberia and Ethiopia, as the only two self-
governing African States during the life of the League, attempted to seize
the opportunity in 1960, applying to the Court for a ruling that South
Africa had breached the mandate, but also seeking a determination
concerning "the continued existence of the Mandate." At the prelimi-
nary objections phase of the proceeding in 1962, the ICJ affirmed that it
had jurisdiction. Given that both Ethiopia and Liberia's objections as to
South Africa's performance of its obligations under the mandate consti-
tuted a "legal dispute" within the meaning of Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the Court,47 and the dispute resolution provisions of the mandate,
which had conferred jurisdiction upon the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (PCIJ), and thus by operation of Article 37 of the Statute,
the ICJ jurisdiction was clear.4' The ICJ rejected the argument that
dissolution of the League undercut the standing of any State, formerly a
member of the League, to assert a legal interest in relation to the perfor-
mance of the mandate.49
Nonetheless, at the next phase of the proceeding in 1966, the ICJ
held that the particular obligations under the mandate at issue in Ethiopia
and Liberia's applications did not involve duties South Africa owed to
States as such but rather only those owed earlier to the League of Na-
tions as a separate juridical entity created by States (and now to the
League's successor),50 Liberia and Ethiopia thus lacked standing as to the
particular legal interests they sought to assert.5
46. South-West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 321 (Dec. 21)
(reporting filing of Applications in the Registry of the Court on November 4, 1960). These two
African States were the only majority black-ruled African members of the League, and thus,
were the only African States in theory legally capable of asserting legal interests in the
mandate derived solely from original rights under the League mandate. But see infra note 53.
47. See South-West Africa, supra note 46, at 328 (finding that there was no doubt about
the existence of a dispute between the Parties before the Court).
48. See iet at 329-33.
49. See id. at 334 (stating that League of Nations intended mandates to continue after the
end of its own existence).
50. See South-West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 22-26 (July
18).
51. The ICJ reached its conclusion by categorizing South Africa's obligations under the
mandate as comprising two distinct classes: obligations relating to South Africa's "conduct" in
the territory, owed initially to the League; and obligations involving "special interests" of the
members of the League directly or in relation to the treatment of their nationals. ld at 49-50.
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The effect of this standing ruling was to foreclose binding review of
South Africa's discharge of its obligations with respect to the people of
Namibia, since only contentious cases between States benefit from res
judicata effect under Article 59 of the Statute.52 Admittedly, the Court
might have circumvented the narrow standing theory that prevailed in its
holding, perhaps by viewing Ethiopia and Liberia's claims as appropriate
assertions of the rights of others. For example, jus tertii, which applies
in cases where no other party is capable of asserting the legal interests
implicated, could have been utilized since neither the United Nations'
organs nor Namibia, neither of which were States, was able to bring a
contentious case before the Court.53 Instead, although only through the
tie-breaking, or "casting," vote of the President of the Court, Judge
Spender,54 the ICJ chose not to determine whether South Africa had
breached its obligations or to address, as Liberia and Ethiopia had
sought, the implications of South Africa's breach for "the continued
existence of the Mandate." 55 Instead, the ICJ's abstention directed these
questions to the international political community, inviting it to answer
through a prudential judgment applying the principles the ICJ articulated
in its earlier Namibia jurisprudence.
In the merits phase of the proceeding, the Court concluded only the former obligations were
implicated in the dispute, and, in a perfect Hohfeldian syllogism, former Member States of the
League did not have the right to seek the enforcement of legal duties not owed to them. See
id. at 50; see generally Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1914).
52. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 59.
53. Indeed, the Court subsequently reversed the practical effect of its standing holding in
the South-West Africa cases by identifying a class of duties, including obligations of a State
in respect of the treatment of its own nationals, that are owed to all States-that is, obligations
erga omnes. See Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (BeIg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction] (rejecting the Belgian
government's application espousing the claim of Belgian shareholders of a Canadian company
whose property was allegedly expropriated because the claim was held by the company itself
as a distinct juridical entity and, therefore, was espousable only by Canada). The erga omnes
construct seems likely to be invoked in the same kinds of cases in which a jus tertii standing
rule would be useful. Indeed, as a noted American constitutional scholar has argued, many
cases of jus tertii are better understood as first-party cases, where the putative third party
actually holds the right to interact with the first-party rightholder as provided by the substan-
tive right at issue. See Henry Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277,
297-310 (1984) (discussing "interactive" liberty interests). However, in the context of the
overall structure of the international legal system, which historically has taken a narrow view
of third-party rights, it may well fit better in the legal landscape. See generally CHRISTINE
CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993) (discussing the classic pacta tertiis
nec nocent nec prosunt rule, under which treaties do not bind and or give legal rights to non-
parties except as expressly varied by the parties with the consent of non-parties, and the rule's
relation to other contexts, such as international judicial procedure); cf. Vienna Convention,
supra note 27, arts. 36-38 (setting forth relationship of third parties of a treaty).
54. See South-West Africa, supra note 50, at 51 (declaration of Judge Spencer).
55. South-West Africa, supra note 50, at 18.
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The standing holding in the South-West Africa cases might be
explained by the ICJ' s recognition of the limits of its powers and need to
preserve its institutional credibility. It might have been disastrous for the
Court to reach the merits yet see its decision ignored by the major
powers who alone were capable of compelling South Africa's compliance
through Security Council action.56 Yet, the ICJ's abstention was also not
without political risk. Arguably, the abstention alienated the ICJ from the
newly independent States. Indeed, this risk was particularly acute in light
of the ICJ's holding three years earlier that it could not adjudicate the
merits in the Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons, where the ICJ
concluded that the General Assembly's termination of its Trusteeship
Agreement with the U.K. mooted the Republic of Cameroons's objection
to the procedure under which the U.K. united Northern Cameroons with
Nigeria.57
Yet, the Court's abstention in the South-West Africa cases is better
understood in light of the changing balance of political power in the
United Nations-a transformation of international politics that made the
ICJ's embarking on a dialogue with the political organs of the U.N.
likely, for the first time, to achieve an outcome that accorded with the
principles of the U.N. Charter.58 With decolonization during the 1960s,
the emerging majority of states in the General Assembly reflected
political views much less sympathetic to the continued practice of
apartheid in Namibia as well as the continuing frustration of the
Namibian people's right to self-determination.59
Immediately after the standing decision, the General Assembly
adopted Resolution 2145 (XXI), which purported to terminate the man-
date and declare the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia
illegal. 6° It took the Security Council only until 1970 when it, too, in
Resolution 276 declared the continued presence of South Africa in
Namibia illegal.6' Both political organs of the international community
had now engaged in the debate compelled by the ICJ's earlier abstention,
and with the Security Council's request for an advisory opinion on the
56. See generally W.M. Reisman, International Non-Liquet: Recrudescence and Transfor-
mation, 3 INT'L LAW. 770, 773 (1969) ("The Court may have felt that any decision would be
ineffective.").
57. See Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons [Cameroon v. U.K.], 1963 I.C.J. 15
(Dec. 2).
58. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2 (purposes and principles); id. arts. 55, 56 (human rights
provisions); id. arts. 73, 74 (declaration regarding non-self-governing territories).
59. See generally SOHN, supra note 27.
60. See G.A. Res. 2145 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. (1966).
61. See S.C. Res. 276, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/276 (1970).
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legal consequences for States of South Africa's defiance of Resolution
276, the ICJ was asked the narrow question of whether the Council's
action, based as it was on the General Assembly's earlier decision,
exceeded the powers of the United Nations. 62 The ICJ's answer affirmed
the principled criteria it had set forth in the earlier Namibia decisions
regarding South Africa's own behavior. The mere fact that the ICJ
decision lacked res judicata effect, as it would have pursuant to Article
59 of the Statute of the Court for the contentious South-West Africa
cases, does not undercut its significance as an instance of authoritative
judicial review. The precedential impact of advisory opinions is at least
as great as that of contentious cases. 63
The ICJ's advisory opinion also confirmed the mechanisms impro-
vised by the General Assembly and the Security Council to terminate the
mandate. First, the ICJ confirmed the primacy of the Council for
Nambia-which the Assembly had created as an organ of the U.N.
responsible for Namibia-in the management of Namibia's resources by
invalidating all legal claims of third parties, such as investors relying on
South Africa's mandate for Namibia, as inconsistent with the duty of
States not to recognize South Africa's continued unlawful occupation.'
Second, the ICJ confirmed the General Assembly's expansion of its law-
making power when it validated the Assembly's determination that South
Africa breached the mandate. This encouraged the Assembly in future
cases to legislate community norms through so-called declarations,
notwithstanding the fact that its sole textually committed power is to
make "recommendations. '65 Third, the ICJ validated the Security Coun-
cil's expansion of its powers to take binding action pursuant to Articles
24 and 25 of the Charter, even in the absence of a "threat to the peace"
62. See S.C. Res. 284, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/284 (1970).
63. See MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 165-71 (1996)(then sitting Judge of the Court acknowledging the absence of any formal doctrine of stare
decisis in international adjudication but maintaining, nonetheless, that earlier pronouncements
of the ICJ, whether in the contentious or advisory modes, carry weight in the continuing
process of reasoned decision making).
64. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16, 43-48 (June 21) [hereinafter Legal Consequences for States] (approving termination
of Mandate by General Assembly); id. at 54 (invalidating legal title of South Africa); id. at
51-54 (approving termination of Mandate by Security Council); id. at 55-56 (imposing
obligation on Member States to refrain from entering into economic relationship with South
Africa on behalf of Namibia).
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 10; see generally Jonathan I. Charley, Universal International
Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993) (concluding that the evolution of informal international
law-making process may result in the increased creation of international norms "endowed with
greater legitimacy").
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under Chapter VII of the Charter.66 Thus, the ICJ first stimulated and
later validated constitutional decisionmaking by the U.N.'s political
organs, which in applying the law of the U.N. Charter to meet the needs
of international community may have transformed the transnational
political community's understanding of the Charter's meaning and the
U.N.'s powers.
An advisory opinion that did not validate the constitutionality of the
means selected by the political process might well have condemned the
ICJ to a continuation of the obscurity and neglect of the political com-
munity it suffered following the standing decision in the second phase of
the South-West Africa Case.67 The Court, having initiated a constitutional
dialogue between the General Assembly and Security Council, a debate
that became an international cause c6l~bre, was in no position to reject
the conclusions of that dialogue. Having made its Faustian bargain not to
discharge its "duty to decide," the Court now was compelled to observe
it. Yet this bargain serves, I believe, as a useful paradigm case for
assessing the validity of abstention by the Court from pronouncements
purporting to apply legal principles to resolve issues definitively, partic-
ularly where the activation of the transnational political process may well
be better calculated to achieve prudential judgments that accord with
principle and, at the same time, stiffen the sinews of transnational
democracy by forcing their strenuous exercise.
II. ABSTENTION IN THE ABSENCE OF NECESSARY PARTIES-THE
PASSAGE FROM THE CORFU CHANNEL TO THE TIMOR GAP
Because the ICJ originated from arbitral practice prior to the First
World War,68 its jurisdiction in contentious cases is, like that of any
arbitral body, founded on the consent of the parties.69 Thus, in its very
first contentious case, the Corfu Channel Case, it was argued that the
absence of Yugoslavia and Greece from the proceedings precluded
adjudication, since Britain accused Yugoslvia and Albania accused
Greece of laying mines off the Albanian coast which damaged British
66. Legal Consequences for States, supra note 64, at 52.
67. In the five-year period following 1966 until the announcement of the opinion in Legal
Consequences for States, only one dispute was brought before the Court, i.e., North Sea
Continental Shelf [F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.], 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). The dominant
impression among newly independent States was clearly that the Court was not receptive to
their concerns.
68. See generally EYFFINGER, supra note 34, at 40-71 (chronicling development from the
first Hague Peace Conference to the Permanent Court of International Justice).
69. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36.
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warships in transit through the Channel.70 Nonetheless, the ICJ held this
no barrier to adjudication on the merits, notwithstanding Greece and
Yugoslavia's refusal to consent to jurisdiction. The ICJ was able to
resolve the case on the merits on the theory that Albania breached its
own duties as a coastal State not to permit the impairment of the U.K.'s
right of innocent passage through Albania's territorial waters, irrespective
of whether the mines were originally laid by a third State.7'
In the first case in which the Court actually abstained because of the
absence of a necessary party,72 the Case of Monetary Gold Removed from
Rome in 1943, the ICJ concluded that it could not adjudicate the merits
because the absent party, Albania's, "legal interests would ... form the
very subject-matter of the decision."' 7' The Court assumed, perhaps incor-
rectly, that it was undisputed that Albania held title to the gold.74 It did
not seem to matter that the ICJ could have avoided prejudicing Albania's
interests by simply limiting itself to determining only which of the
parties to the dispute before the Court was, as between the two alone, the
superior claimant. Neither did it matter that the ICJ might have resolved
the situation by permitting, as would a U.S. federal court, the interven-
tion of the absent party.75 In rejecting the U.K.'s argument that Albania's
70. See Corfu Channel [U.K. v. Alb.] (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 15-17, 29 (Apr. 9).
71. See id. at 17. See also CHINKIN, supra note 53, at 199-212 (discussing this case and
its progeny).
72. One might compare this judge-made doctrine with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19(b), which provides that when certain criteria are satisfied and a person "cannot be made a
party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus
regarded as indispensable." FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). In addition, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 19(a), the court must order joinder of this "necessary party" when:
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties,
or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); see generally WRIGHT, supra note 28, §§ 70-71 (discussing the classifi-
cation and joinder of parties). Nothing in the ICJ Statute, however, explicitly provides the ICJ
with the power to order joinder of a necessary party, or because of the consequences joinder
would have on the ICJ's jurisdiction, to dismiss an application because joinder would defeat
jurisdiction or the failure to join the absent party would be manifestly unjust.
73. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., and U.S.), 1954
I.C.J. 19, 32 [hereinafter Monetary Gold].
74. See id. But see CHINKIN, supra note 53, at 200 n.57 (questioning whether Italy may
have had independent rights to the gold, notwithstanding an arbitrator's prior finding in favor
of the Albanian claim).
75. The Statute of the ICJ ostensibly distinguishes between permissive intervention and
intervention as of right. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 62, para.
1 ("Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by
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absence should not be a barrier to adjudication because Albania was free
to request intervention, the ICJ argued that this rationale would make the
ICJ's determination of its own jurisdiction dependent on uncertain events.76
the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene.");
cf. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) ("Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application,
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States
confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common.").
Article 63(1) and (2) of the ICJ Statute provide: "Whenever the construction of a conven-
tion to which states other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the
Registrar shall notify all such states forthwith," and "Every state so notified has the right to
intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgment
will be equally binding upon it." STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 63,
paras. 1, 2. Compare the ICJ Statute with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Intervention of Right. Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an uncondi-
tional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
76. See Monetary Gold, supra note 73, at 32. Chinkin defends the ICJ's conclusion that
the defect in jurisdiction could not have been cured by permitting Albania's intervention
pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute. CHINKIN, supra note 53, at 200. She suggests that
intervention should only allow "a third State to participate in proceedings that have already
been legitimately commenced, which is not the case where there is no jurisdiction." Id This
point seems to be premised on the view that the Court lacks discretion under the Monetary
Gold doctrine whether or not to abstain in the first place. If, however, as suggested below, the
Monetary Gold abstention doctrine also is grounded on prudential considerations and admits
a degree of flexibility in its use, then the permissibility of intervention might be a legitimate
criterion in whether the absence of a party should preclude adjudication. See infra note 106
(discussing separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in East Timor).
The flexibility of the ICJ's intervention practice further suggests the plasticity of the
rationale underlying Monetary Gold. Compare Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 215 (Oct. 4) (denying El Salvador's request, even for a hearing in a case
arguably involving multilateral treaty interpretation under Article 63 of the Statute) with Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), Application for Permission to Intervene,
1990 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 13) (granting Nicaragua's application in a case involving only "an interest
of a legal nature" under Article 62 of the Statute). Others have disagreed as to whether these
decisions reflect legal indeterminacy or merely different position, one of which is more
authoritative. Compare SHABTAI ROSENNE, INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 190 (1993) ("So extensive indeed are [the] ambiguities and obscurities [of the relevant
article of the statute], that they alone give the Court a broad discretion as to how it will deal
with any case of intervention, through processes of interpretation in addition to its formal
discretion under the Statute.") with Stephen M. Schwebel, Book Review, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
835, 836 (1995) (reviewing CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1993)) (noting Chinkin's argument that the ICJ 1990 decision by a Chamber of the Court may
well have lesser precedential value than the full Court's 1984 decision not to permit interven-
tion). A third position suggested by reading the Monetary Gold principle as prudential is that
the ICJ's intervention doctrine could also usefully be analyzed as yet another weapon in the
"arsenal of devices" for prudential abstention. But see ROSENNE, supra, at 196 (writing that
"intervention in international legal proceedings, especially those before the International Court
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Given the unique facts of the Monetary Gold case, and the weakness
of its doctrinal underpinnings, it was commonly thought that its reason-
ing had little precedential value.77 This view seemed confirmed in 1992,
when in Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, the Court refused to apply
Monetary Gold in a close case.78 Nauru had been the subject of joint
administration by Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and
arguably any decision on the merits that Australia had breached its
obligations under a mandate and later trusteeship might well have deter-
mined whether New Zealand and the United Kingdom, which declined to
intervene, had also breached their obligations.79 The legal question in this
regard was whether Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom's
liability for breach of obligations as Administering Authorities was joint,
implying perhaps that a determination of breach by one would also imply
breach by the others, or joint and several, suggesting that adjudication
could proceed against one without necessarily entailing liability for the
others."0 In any event, the Court declined to resolve this question in the
preliminary objection's phase, deferring it until adjudication on the
merits,8' and perhaps for all time when the issue was mooted upon the
parties reaching a settlement.8 2
Thus, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru revealed the limits of the
rationale underlying the abstention rule of Monetary Gold. If the decision
in Monetary Gold was grounded on the importance of not purporting to
bind a non-party to a contentious case, then Article 59 of the statute's
plain text dictates the conclusion that a non-party could never in subse-
quent litigation before the Court be bound by the results of a former
adjudication to which it was not a party. 3 If, however, the concern
of Justice, with sovereign States as bar, cannot be assessed on a scale of values derived from
the experience of internal legal systems or any supra-national legal system").
77. See ROSENNE, supra note 25, at 431; see also CHINKIN, supra note 53, at 200 n.59(stating that the Monetary Gold facts are specific with little precedential value).
78. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 259-62 (June
26) [hereinafter Certain Phosphate Lands].
79. See id. at 262. For the texts of the relevant agreements, see Nauru Island Agreement
Act, 1919 (Austl.); Nauru Island Agreement Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 27 (Eng.);
Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru, Nov. 1, 1947, 10 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement
Relating to Nauru, Nov. 26, 1965, Austl.-N.Z.-U.K., 1965 Austl. T.S. No. 20; Agreement to
Terminate the Nauru Island Agreement 1919, Feb. 9, 1987, Austl.-N.Z.-U.K., 1987 Austl. T.S.
No. 8.
80. See Certain Phosphate Lands, supra note 78, at 262.
81. See id.
82. See Australia-Republic of Nauru: Settlement of the Case in the International Court of
Justice Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 32 I.L.M. 1471 (1993).
83. See SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 63, at 63 ("Article 59... is limited to defining the
legal relations of the parties only.").
[Vol. 18:399
The Passive Virtues and the World Court
underlying the rule is whether an adjudication in which the third party
was not involved would have some precedential effect as a practical
matter," then the Monetary Gold formulation is inappropriate, because it
treats as a binary question an issue that is rather one of degree. Every
State has, to some extent, an interest in the development of international
law by the Court since the law the Court develops may well affect partic-
ular legal interests of States in present or future disputes.8' While this
general interest in the development of international law clearly could not
warrant intervention by any or all States, 6 it does suggest that the
Court's use of the Monetary Gold doctrine cannot be understood solely
in terms of the res judicata effect of ICJ decisions.
If the Court's abstention on the ground of the absence of a neces-
sary party admits discretion in determining whether a party is necessary,
then the Monetary Gold doctrine can be reformulated in a way that
facilitates the exercise of this discretion based on the role the adjudica-
tion plays in the larger legal system. The discretionary character of the
Monetary Gold doctrine became manifest in the recent Case Concerning
East Timor,7 where for the first time since Monetary Gold the ICJ
declined to exercise jurisdiction because of the legal interest of an
absent third party.88 The legal dispute, in Portugal's view, concerned the
Treaty of 1989 between Australia and Indonesia concerning the Timor
Gap-Zone of Cooperation, which delimited the continental shelf off the
coast of East Timor. 9 Portugal, the former Administering Authority of
the U.N. Trusteeship over East Timor, claimed that Australia, in enter-
ing into the agreement, violated not only the rights of the people of East
84. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 41-42 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992); see also SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 63, at 67-69, 107-09.
85. See SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 63, at 55-66, 107--09. The concern is manifest and
respected in the Court's advisory opinion practice, where States are free to make submissions
to the ICJ to facilitate its work. See Revised Rules of the Court, 1977 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. art.
63, para. 2 (stating that if "a public international organization sees fit to furnish, on its own
initiative, information relevant to a case before the Court," it may do so).
86. See SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 63, at 55-66 (discussing, inter alia, preparatory work
of PCIJ Statute and the rejection of the view that intervention should be as of right generally
rather than, as ultimately agreed, only in the narrow case of disputes concerning the interpre-
tation of a multilateral treaty to which the intervening State was also a party); cf. STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE arts. 62, 63.
87. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
88. See generally Peter H.F. Bekker, Casenote: East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 94, 98 (1996) (noting that the "East Timor Judgment appears to contradict what
some observers may have regarded as a trend toward 'judicial activism' in establishing
jurisdiction"). Accord James A.R. Nafziger, Thomas J. Bodie 's Politics and the Emergence of
an Activist International Court of Justice, 20 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM (forthcoming) (book
review).
89. See East Timor, supra note 87, at 94.
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Timor to self-determination by recognizing Indonesia's unlawful occupa-
tion-rights of an erga omnes character Portugal was entitled to as-
sert ----but also Australia's separate duty to Portugal not to impede
Portugal's fulfillment of its obligations as Administering Power.91
The Court observed that after Indonesia ejected Portuguese authori-
ties from East Timor in December 1975, Security Council Resolution 384
called on Indonesia to withdraw and "all States to respect the territorial
integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to
self-determination." 92 In addition, Resolution 389 (1976) called upon "all
States to cooperate fully with the United Nations to achieve a peaceful
resolution of the existing situation. 93 The ICJ noted that in the days
following the ouster, the General Assembly explicitly referred to Portugal
as "the Administering Power," notwithstanding the Indonesian occu-
pation.' Conceding that these facts gave rise to a "dispute" between
Portugal and Australia within the meaning of Article 38(1) of the Stat-
ute,95 the Court nonetheless held that Portugal's claim "cannot be as-
sessed without first entering into the question why it is that Indonesia
could not lawfully have concluded the 1989 Treaty, while Portugal
allegedly could have done so."'96 An absent third party's legal interest
thus precluded adjudication.
Nonetheless, in coming to its conclusion, the Court performed its
"grand" function of articulating the relevant international legal principles
by affirming that, "for the two Parties, the Territory of East Timor
remains a non-self-governing territory and its people have the right to
self-determination." 97 Note that the Court's formulation employed a
reminder that the res judicata effect of its decision was limited to the two
parties over whom it had jurisdiction, even if under the Monetary Gold
rule against admissibility it could not fully adjudicate the merits of the
dispute. Yet, East Timor is self-governing, as occupied by Indonesia, or
non-self-governing, and the Court clearly held that it is non-self-
90. See Barcelona Traction, supra note 53.
91. See East Timor, supra note 87, at 94.
92. S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/384 (1975); see also East
Timor, supra note 87, at 96.
93. S.C. Res. 389, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/389 (1976); see also East
Timor, supra note 87, at 96.
94. East Timor, supra note 87, at 96 (citing G.A. Res. 3458 (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th
Sess. A/RES/3485 collected in DOC A/10034 (1975)).
95. See East Timor, supra note 87, at 99-100.
96. East Timor, supra note 87, at 102.
97. Il at 105-06.
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governing.9" How then could the Court's statement be read in any other
way than as a verdict on Indonesia's legal interest in East Timor, the
very matter the Court felt it would have to, and under Monetary Gold
could not, address in adjudicating the merits of Portugal's claim against
Australia?
Yet, if the principles stated in the Court's opinion ultimately vindi-
cate the Portuguese claim and the rights of the East Timorese, the
decision seems to make a mockery of the clear line of precedent the
Court developed in Barcelona Traction and Legal Consequences. These
precedents expanded standing to assert human rights, including the right
to self-determination, and thus, allowed the court to require that States
not cooperate in a violation of those rights.99 Why then did the ICJ not
proceed to the next step and declare invalid Australia's "de facto recog-
nition" of Indonesia unlawful occupation of East Timor."0
This apparent inconsistency in the ICJ's jurisprudence could be
resolved, as some of the judges of the Court seemed to realize, by
reformulating Monetary Gold as a doctrine of prudential abstention.
However, the debate found in the separate opinions of Judges Oda and
Shahabuddeen reflects the ICJ's discomfort with the "arsenal of devices"
for prudential abstention that the court had constructed for itself. Judge
Shahabuddeen characterized the ground of inadmissibility asserted by the
Court as a question of "balance," in which "what the Court has been
doing was to identify some limit beyond which the degree to which the
non-party State would be affected would exceed what is judicially
tolerable."' 0 ' Judge Oda, recognizing the elasticity of the Monetary Gold
98. See id.
99. See id. at 142 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (arguing that dicta from
Monetary Gold should be contained); Judge Weeramantry-a citizen of Sri Lanka, see
EYFFINGER, supra note 34, at 335, which, like East Timor, lives in the shadow of a larger
State whose mere mass challenges the existence of the smaller States surrounding
it-poignantly observed:
The preliminary objection to the jus standi of Portugal calls into question the
adequacy of the entire protective structure fashioned by the United Nations Charter
for safeguarding the interests of non-self-governing territories, not yet in a position
themselves to look after their own interests.
Australia's submission that it is not in breach of any international duty
necessitates a consideration of State obligations implicit in the principle of self-
determination, the very basis of nationhood of the majority of Member States of the
United Nations.
East Timor, supra note 87, at 142-43.
100. East Timor, supra note 87, at 97 (noting statement of February 23, 1978 of Austra-
lian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that "we recognize the fact that East Timor is
part of Indonesia, but not the means by which this was brought about").
101. Id. at 119, 120 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
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principle, would have held that the case was inadmissible on standing
grounds; namely, because the rights at issue related to those of a coastal
State in maritime boundary delimitation, and whatever might be said of
Portugal's legal rights in other respects, Portugal had long ceased to be
the "coastal state" for purposes of the Timor Gap.1' 2
The virtue of Judge Oda's approach is that it gives the appearance of
a neutral, non-discretionary process of judicial decisionmaking; either the
applicant has the status claimed, thereby entailing correlative rights, or
the applicant does not. Judge Oda thus would have transformed the
politically explosive question of the effects of Indonesia's refusal to
come before the ICJ to answer for its conduct into a more technical,
politically neutral question concerning the law of the sea. But as dis-
cussed above, Judge Oda's method also suffered from the vice of having
been tried in the South-West Africa cases where the Court purported to
divest itself of the power in contentious cases to review South Africa's
performance of its obligations under the mandate.'0 3 Yet, if it became
clear that the application of the Monetary Gold rule was, as Judge
Shahauddeen suggested, a question of degree, Judge Oda may have felt
the need to offer a depoliticized abstention solution to the case.
Even more revealing are the grounds upon which the ICJ exercised
that discretion. Here it seems the Court felt the need not to anticipate
prudential judgments of the political organs; ° for, in rejecting Portugal's
argument that the Security Council and General Assembly had already
determined the non-existence of any rights Indonesia might assert," the
Court found that "it cannot be inferred ... that [the General Assembly
and the Security Council] intended to establish an obligation on third
states to treat exclusively with Portugal as regards the continental shelf
of East Timor.' ' 1°6 The ICJ added that, even in the face of the 1989
Treaty and related measures, "no responsive action was taken either by
102. Id. at 107, 118 (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 43-54.
104. Judge Ranjeva, for example, explicitly alluded to the Court's need to refrain from
"choosing between the practical measures which the interested states or the competent organs
of the United Nations can take in order to solve the more general problem of East Timor."
East Timor, supra note 87, at 133 (separate opinion of Judge Ranjeva).
105. Portugal argued that "the principal matters on which its claims are based, namely the
status of East Timor as a non-self-governing territory and its own capacity as the Adminis-
tering Power of the Territory, have already been decided by the General Assembly and the
Security Council, acting within their proper spheres of competence." Id. at 103.
106. Id at 104. But see id at 119, 123-24 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen)
(arguing that, even if Portugal's interpretation of the Security Council and General Assembly
resolutions were correct, he would hold that the Monetary Gold principle would apply, since
the Court would still "be passing on Indonesia's legal interests").
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the General Assembly or the Security Council."' ' 7 The ICJ thus refused
to attribute legal significance to twenty-year old, potentially inconsis-
tent, 08 pronouncements that, unlike the outpouring of General Assembly
and Security Council activity that preceded the Court's 1971 advisory
opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of South Africa's Con-
tinued Presence in Namibia, did not clearly express the recent and
considered judgment of the political organs of the international com-
munity.' °9
The ICJ's concern over the passage of time, like Bickel's character-
ization of desuetude as a doctrine whose purpose is to assure political
accountability by the law-making organs of government,"0 flows from its
underlying view that the judicial role is not only to decide cases accord-
ing to law but also to stimulate reasoned debate that ensures that the law
the ICJ applies reflects the political community's best judgment in the
application of principles to its preferred policies. The Court's reasoning
thus implicitly invited the political organs to revisit the issue of East
Timor in a more authoritative way. As it had in its standing decision in
the second phase of the South-West Africa cases, the Court indirectly
posed questions to the political organs of the U.N., that they might make
their intentions clear."' Indeed, the conferral of the Nobel Peace Prize to
East Timorese figures struggling to bring this issue to the world's
attention could be seen as part of the dialogue the Court's decision has
stimulated on how to permit the people of East Timor to exercise their
judicially recognized right of self-determination." 2
107. Id. at 104.
108. The ICJ may also have been concerned by the gap between the positions of the
General Assembly and Security Council, since the Council had called for the cooperation of
"all" States in the Security Council's efforts to resolve the issue while the General Assembly
confirmed Portugal's continuing special status as Administering Power. Compare S.C. Res.
384, supra note 92, paras. 3-4, with G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX), supra note 94.
109. Recognizing its centrality to the Court's reasoning, Judge Weeramantry in dissent
argued that "[t]here is no warrant in United Nations law" for attributing significance to the
"lapse of time" and "supposedly diminishing support" for the Security Council and General
Assembly's resolutions. East Timor, supra note 87, at 155 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Weeramantry).
110. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 148-56, 223.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61.
112. See, e.g., Keith Suter, Nobel Hears East Timor, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTIST, Jan./Feb.
1996, at 47.
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III. ABSTENTION IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRILOGY
In the last two years, a trilogy of nuclear weapons cases has come
before the ICJ, 3 and in each case the Court avoided pronouncements
that would foreclose current or politically plausible future nuclear weap-
ons activities by States under their own authority or pursuant to United
Nations authorization. Each case illustrates the use of a distinct device
for prudential abstention in which the ICJ performed its "grand" function
of articulating principled criteria yet stimulating a dialogue in the interna-
tional political community for making prudential judgments concerning
the possession, testing, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
A. Law of the Case and Mootness Redux-New Zealand v. France
In 1974, the Court held that New Zealand's challenge to France's
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific was mooted
by France's binding unilateral declaration that it would discontinue such
tests."14 Moreover, while the Nuclear Test Case was pending, France
withdrew from the treaty that had originally served as the basis for
jurisdiction." 5 Under paragraph 63 of its opinion, however, the ICJ re-
tained jurisdiction over the matter to the extent that "the basis" for its
judgment was "affected."'" 6
New Zealand maintained that the ICJ's jurisdiction was thus revived
when France announced on June 13, 1995 that it would embark on a
limited campaign of underground tests that would make possible the
gathering of data necessary to France's undertaking a commitment to
enter into a comprehensive test ban treaty."' 7 New Zealand advanced the
113. See generally Request for An Examination of the Situation in Accordance with
Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests [New
Zealand v. France] Cases, 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22); Request of WHO, supra note 41;
Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39.
114. See Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 475, 477 (Dec. 20) [hereinafter
Nuclear Tests].
115. Paragraph 63 of the Nuclear Tests Case, which had reserved New Zealand's right to
"request an examination of the situation," also specifically provided that "the denunciation by
France, by letter dated 2 January 1974, of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, which is relied on as a basis of jurisdiction in the present case, cannot
constitute by itself an obstacle to the presentation of such a request." In theory, therefore, were
France to resume atmospheric testing, the Court would again have jurisdiction. See Peter H.F.
Bekker, New Zealand challenge to underground testing by France in South Pacific-JCJ
Judgment in 1974 Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France) confined to atmospheric
testing-dismissal of New Zealand request to reopen that case, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 282
n.16 (1996).
116. Nuclear Tests, supra note 114, at 477.
117. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22) [hereinafter Underground
Nuclear Tests].
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not implausible argument that, because the "basis" of the ICJ's judgment
was France's decision no longer to conduct atmospheric tests that could
cause environmental damage to New Zealand, and because in the inter-
vening years it had become clear that France also could cause environ-
mental damage through underground tests, the "basis" for the 1974
judgment was "affected."". The ICJ abstained, however, holding that the
precise basis for its judgment was France's commitment not to undertake
above-ground testing, rather than its general commitment relating to all
nuclear tests." 9
Yet, abstention hardly seemed necessary, since the broader inter-
pretation suggested by New Zealand of the ICJ's reservation of jurisdic-
tion would not have risked an expansion of its jurisdiction given the
unique circumstances of the case. t2° In other words, it was as though the
ICJ considered its earlier finding that France's commitment to cease
atmospheric testing to be the "basis" for its judgment was a kind of "law
of the case" to which the Court was now bound.'12 If so, the discretion-
ary character of the ICJ's method becomes clear, for the "law of the
case" doctrine serves policies of finality and judicial economy that may
be ignored where a court, as the ICJ did here, faces new facts or a
change in substantive law.'22
Nonetheless, the ICJ performed its "grand" function of articulating
relevant principles. Without any technical justification, in light of its own
theory of the case, 23 the ICJ announced that "the present Order is
without prejudice to the obligation of States to protect the natural envi-
ronment, obligations to which both New Zealand and France have in the
present instance reaffirmed their commitment."' 24 This reminder no doubt
was of relevance to States then negotiating the terms of a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, which France claimed it would be able to support
because of the information it would obtain through the underground tests
118. See Don MacKay, Nuclear Testing: New Zealand and France in the International
Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1857, 1874 (1996) (account of New Zealand's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs's Legal Adviser). But see id. at 1870 (reporting that New Zea-
land's Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, acknowledged that he was advised that "there would be
considerable legal difficulty" for New Zealand in attempting to revive the case).
119. See Underground Nuclear Tests, supra note 117, at 306.
120. See id. at 309 (separate opinion of Judge Schwebel) (characterizing paragraph 63 as
"singular"); id. at 383, para. 6 (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Palmer) (describing the case
as "a procedural species not seen before").
121. Cf. JAMES WM. MOORE, lB MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, para.
0.404 (1996) (discussing law of the case).
122. See id.
123. See Underground Nuclear Tests, supra note 117, at 285 (suggesting that the Court's
comment was stimulated by the dissenting opinions of Judges Weeramantry and Judge ad hoc
Palmer).
124. Id. at 306.
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New Zealand had sought to block. It was as though the ICJ was remind-
ing France, as well as all other nuclear weapon States seeking to preserve
the option of underground testing, that any State testing nuclear weapons
could not be indifferent to the implications of international environmental
law.
B. Speciality and the Request of the World Health Organization
(WHO)-An Anti-Delegation Doctrine
In what may well be the ICJ's version of Marbury v. Madison,25 the
Court abstained when the WHO sought an advisory opinion from the ICJ
on the legality of the use by a State of nuclear weapons. This marks the
first time in its history that the ICJ declined to respond to a request for
an advisory opinion. 126 Article 65 of the Statute confers upon the ICJ the
power to "give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request
of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Char-
ter of the United Nations to make such a request."' 27 Article 96(2) of the
Charter provides that "specialized agencies, which may at any time be so
authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions
of the Court on legal questions within the scope of their activities."'
' 21
The General Assembly, exercising this power, authorized the WHO to
"request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on legal
questions arising within the scope of its competence."'' 29 But the ICJ
interpreted Article 2 of the WHO Constitution to give the WHO compe-
tence only to "deal with the effects on health of the use of nuclear
125. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (exercising power of judicial review to invalidate
an act of Congress purporting to grant the Supreme Court the power to exercise jurisdiction of
a kind the Constitution itself did not permit the Court to exercise); see also Nicholas Rostow,
The World Health Organization, the International Court of Justice, and Nuclear Weapons, 20
YALE J. INT'L L. 151, 159-160, 160 n.48 (1995) (favoring a limiting construction of the
WHO's competence that would be consistent with the duty under Marbury v. Madison to say
what the law is but also avoid highly-intrusive, current "U.S.-style judicial review").
126. See Request of WHO, supra note 41, at para. 32 (holding that giving the advisory
opinion was beyond the Court's jurisdiction). The PCIJ had in one case declined to exercise
jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion. See Advisory Opinion No. 5, Status of Eastern
Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5. In that case, the PCIJ declined to exercise jurisdiction to
render an advisory opinion, much as the ICJ later would in the contentious case setting of
Monetary Gold and the Case Concerning East Timor, because an absent third party's legal
interests Would be affected. See id. at 5.
127. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 65.
128. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 2.
129.. Agreement between the United Nations and World Health Organization, art. X, para.
2, U.N. Doc. A/348, reprinted in 1947-48 U.N.O.B. 919, U.N. Sales No. 1949.1.3 [hereinafter
UN-WHO Agreement]. The UN-WHO Agreement was approved by the General Assembly,
G.A. Res. 124(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/124 (1947), and by the First World
Health Assembly, Res. WHAI.102, U.N. WHO, Official Records No. 10, at 59 (1948).
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weapons,"'13 and it found that regardless of whether the use of nuclear
weapons was legal, they would have the same consequences on health
and the environment.' 3' Therefore, the "legality" of the use of nuclear
weapons was not a question within the "scope of [the] activities" of the
WHO under Article 96(2) of the Charter, 32 thus placing it outside the
ICJ's competence to render an advisory opinion under Article 65 of the
Statute.
The IC's reasoning, however, drew upon yet another "device" in the
"arsenal" for abstention. Arguably to avoid constitutional difficulty in
interpreting the "scope of the activities" of the WHO, the Court expressly
took account of the WHO's place in the U.N. system by applying the
interpretive presumption that the General Assembly would not be as-
sumed to authorize a specialized agency to address issues that are solely
within the General Assembly's competence. A plausible argument might
also be made that the ICJ authoritatively interpreted the Charter not to
permit the General Assembly to delegate that responsibility, even for the
limited purpose of seeking the advisory opinion of the ICJ. 13 3 The princi-
ple of speciality, the ICJ noted, dictates that international organizations
"are invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of
which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those
States entrust to them.""' But in the context of the WHO, a specialized
organ of the U.N., the ICJ transmuted the principle of speciality to hold
that the WHO's international responsibilities could not:
encroach upon the responsibilities of other parts of the United
Nations system. And there is no doubt that questions concerning the
130. Request of WHO, supra note 41, para. 21; see also id. at para. 20.
131. See id. at para. 21.
132. Id. at para. 22.
133. The Court stated that "any other conclusion would render virtually meaningless the
notion of a specialized agency," suggesting that the Charter itself barred the General Assembly
from delegating competence in this area to the WHO. But it also stated, "[i]t is therefore
difficult to maintain that.., the General Assembly intended" to do so, thus suggesting that its
holding was limited to an interpretation of what the General Assembly did rather than of what
the Charter could be read to permit it to do. Id. at para. 26. But in holding that the General
Assembly resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ did not ratify the otherwise
ultra vires WHO Request, the Court stated that both rationales were applicable:
[T]he Court does not consider that, in doing so, the General Assembly meant to pass
upon the competence of the WHO to request an opinion on the question raised.
Moreover, the General Assembly could evidently not have intended to disregard the
limits within which Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter allows it to authorize the
specialized agencies to request opinions from the Court-limits which were reaf-
firmed in Article X of the relationship agreement ....
Id. at para. 30.
134. Id. at para. 25.
Spring 1997]
Michigan Journal of International Law
use of force, the regulation of armaments and disarmament are
within the competence of the United Nations and lie outside that of
the specialized agencies. 35
Although advisory opinion request of a specialized organ could take the
form of a contentious case under Article 59 of the Statute, in which the
legal interests of only the specialized agency were at stake, 36 the WHO's
request also implicated the ICJ's concern over the effect of its pro-
nouncements on absent parties, in this case the General Assembly.
37
Yet, the ICJ again performed its "grand function" of articulating
principle while stimulating continued constitutional dialogue. In the very
act of refusing to render an advisory opinion, the ICJ pronounced on the
legal relationship between the U.N. and the WHO, even though the U.N.-
WHO Agreement expressly barred a request as to "questions concerning
the mutual relations of the organization and the United Nations or other
specialized agencies."'' 38 Ironically, to avoid rendering an advisory
opinion the ICJ answered precisely the question that it could not have
answered if it had rendered an advisory opinion. In interpreting the
structural relationships between the U.N. and its organs so as to confirm
the primacy of the U.N., the mode of review the Court employed recalled
Bickel's suggestion that the nondelegation doctrine of U.S. constitutional
law, 139 as applied to the exercise of the subpoena power by congressional
committees, serves to assure political accountability by requiring the
principal explicitly to authorize or ratify its agent's claims."'t As applied
135. Id. at para. 26.
136. Roberto Ago, while serving as a judge of the IC, described this mode of advisory
opinion practice, where the constitutional instrument of the specialized agency involved renders
the advisory opinion binding, as the functional equivalent of a request for a decision. See
Roberto Ago, "Binding" Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 439 (1991).
137. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 72-76 (discussing the Monetary Gold principle).
Technically speaking, the General Assembly could not be a "party" to an Article 59 conten-
tious case, because the ICJ's Article 59 jurisdiction extends only to disputes between States,
and therefore the res judicata and precedental concerns underlying Monetary Gold are techni-
cally inapplicable.
138. UN-WHO Agreement, supra note 129, art. X(2).
139. See Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). By parity of reasoning, judicial deference to the interpreta-
tion of an organ or specialized agency of the U.N. would signal respect for the underlying
substantive lawmaking by the General Assembly that conferred law-making power to the
delegee. Cf. Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
28 (1983) (otherwise legislative supremacy would be undercut).
140. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 159-64. See also Braden v. United States, 365 U.S.
431, 432-33 (1961) (finding that Subcommittee's investigation of subjects authorized by
Congress); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 409-13 (1961) (determining that
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities was
pursuing valid legislative purpose); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 430-39 (1960) (finding
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in this case, the General Assembly's delegation of its authority to request
an advisory opinion from the Court was interpreted so that it would not
intrude upon the General Assembly's own request for an answer to a
related, though quite different, question.141 The Court's abstention thus
served to assure that when a political organ spoke, its voice, rather than
that of its delegee, was heard.142
C. Non-Liquet and the Request of the General Assembly for
an Advisory Opinion-The Political Question Doctrine
as the Absence of Manageable Judicial Standards
In performing its "grand" function in the second Nuclear Test Case
regarding peacetime testing of nuclear weapons and abstaining entirely in
the Request of the WHO regarding use of nuclear weapons in armed
conflict, the Court may well have deemed it unnecessary to do more,
since France had in any event undertaken to agree shortly to a compre-
hensive obligation not to test, 143 and the General Assembly itself had
requested an advisory opinion on the subject.)" Because the ICJ held that
the General Assembly's request raised "legal questions," and the General
Assembly's competence arguably extended to nuclear Weapons,"45 the ICJ
that Commission on Civil Rights was authorized to adopt challenged rules of procedures);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 116-23 (1959) (upholding conviction of petitioner,
who refused to answer questions before a Subcommittee of the House of Representatives
Committee on Un-American Activities after summoned to testify; Committee's authority not
unconstitutionally vague); Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (holding that Congress
may not conduct an investigation unrelated to legislative purposes).
141. See Request of WHO, supra note 41, at 33 (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma).
Judge Koroma stated that:
[The Court nonetheless interpreted those questions in such a way as to have
ascribed almost identical meanings to them. It was this interpretation which emas-
culated the meaning of the WHO's question as if it had asked about the legality of
the use of nuclear weapons per se, as in the case of the question by the General
Assembly, and led the Court to conclude that the request for an advisory opinion by
the WHO does not relate to a question arising within the scope of its activities.
Id. (discussing the role of the Court in exercising its advisory function).
142. Cf Rostow, supra note 125, at 162 ("The General Assembly and the Security
Council are institutions of general jurisdiction; duplicates create confusion and competition.").
143. See Nuclear Tests, supra note 117; see also William Drozdiak, Chirac Ends
France's Nuclear Test Program: Paris to Take "Active" Role in Disarmament, WASHINGTON
POST, Jan. 30, 1996, at A10; William Drozdiak, France's Nuclear Storm: Plan To Test
Resuming in Pacific Unleashes Typhoon of Anger, WASHINGTON POST, July 8, 1995, at A5
(describing how public outcries against French nuclear testing were muffled by France's
announcement that it would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).
144. See G.A. Res. 49/75, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75 (1994).
145. See infra text accompanying notes 174-80 (discussing competence of General
Assembly and Security Council over nuclear weapons); see also, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 11,
para. 1 ("The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the
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could not avoid deciding, as it had in the WHO Request for an advisory
opinion, on the ground that the legal question was outside the General
Assembly's competence."6 Under the Court's own jurisprudence, only
"compelling reasons" would permit it to exercise the discretion the
Statute gives it to decline to render an advisory opinion."7 Finding no
compelling reasons, therefore, the ICJ spoke. Yet, what it did not say
was even more important than what it did say. The Court refused to
determine whether the right of self-defense trumped rules against the
indiscriminate use of force as applied to nuclear weapons. Despite
appearances, in this case too the ICJ's rehetoric exemplified the passive
virtues.
1. Non-Liquet
On the surface, the advisory opinion reads as a delicate compromise
predicated on the appearance of the ICJ's having no other alternative.
Paragraph 2.E of the dispositif rendered the ICJ's central conclusion that
"the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the
rules of international law," but that, "in view of the current state of
international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court
cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense,
in which the very survival of a State would be at stake. 1 48 The ICJ's
formulation arguably amounted to a holding of non-liquet, in which a
judge declines to pronounce judgment because of an alleged gap or
insufficiency in the law. 149
maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarma-
ment and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such
principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.").
146. The ICJ said "it is not for the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an
advisory opinion is needed by the Assembly for the performance of its functions. The General
Assembly has the right to decide for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its
own needs." Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 819.
147. See id. at 818.
148. Id. at 831.
149. See generally SHAHABUDDEEN, supra note 63, at 87-96 (treating the problem within
the general framework of a modest interstitial law-making power for the ICJ, which, though
precedent for the Court as master of its own competence, may or may not be accepted by the
international community); Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1983)
(treating law as a binary system, in which there are no gaps because either the plaintiff wins
or the defendant wins); Reisman, supra note 56 (arguing that, not theoretical gaps in the law,
but institutional and pragmatic considerations explain and justify the decisions that in effect are
non-liquets even if the Court does not describe them as such); Julius Stone, Non-Liquet and
the Function of Law in the International Community, 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 124 (1959)
(critiquing Siorat and Lauterpacht, infra, and concluding that there is no rule prohibiting non-
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Under one view of the non-liquet problem, the ICJ's abstention
would not be an indirect exercise of the discretion the statute gives the
ICJ to decline to answer a request for an advisory opinion, for Article 65
does not appear to allow the ICJ to refuse to answer, as it did here,
merely a part of the question before it, but rather allows it to refuse, as
it did not in this case, to respond to a request as a whole.'- The ICJ's
refusal to answer would therefore imply that the World Court was not
empowered to say more until the authoritative law-making organs of the
political community created new law to fill the gap. Abstention would be
required by law.
It is not clear, however, that the ICJ's formulation was in fact a non-
liquet, at least in the sense of a gap in the law leaving the ICJ no choice
but to abstain. Judge Shahabuddeen, for example, argued that the ICJ's
formulation should not be interpreted as a non-liquet. He maintained that
any gap suggested by paragraph 2.E could be resolved through answering
the underlying question whether nuclear weapons may be used in self-
defense unless there is a prohibitory rule or whether nuclear weapons
may not be used in the absence of a rule permitting their use.
Shahabuddeen framed this issue as a dispute over the interpretation of
the Lotus Case, which has long been understood to permit States to do
anything that is not prohibited by a rule of international law.'52 Under the
received view of the Lotus Case, because there was no rule of prohibi-
tion, the use of nuclear weapons in accordance with the right of self-
defense would be lawful. But Shahabuddeen suggested the Lotus Case
might be limited to its facts, given changes in international society and
law, so that use of nuclear weapons would be prohibited unless a State
liquet); L. SIORAT, LE PROBLEME DES LACUNES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL: CONTRIBUTION A
L' ETUDE DES SOURCES DU DROIT ET DE LA FONCTION JUDICIAIRE (1958) (arguing that State
practice suggests that international law in some cases actually requires a non-liquet); H.
LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 127-38 (1966);
Hersch Lauterpacht, Some Observations on the Prohibition of 'Non-Liquet' and the Complete-
ness of the Legal Order, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 196, 199 n.2 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1958)
[hereinafter Lauterpacht, Non-Liquet] (arguing that a non-liquet in a contentious case is
forbidden as a matter of law but recognizing that "the problem assumes a different complex-
ion" in advisory opinions).
150. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 65, para. 1. A non-
liquet would also be problematic because it would run afoul of the travaux prifparatoires of
the Statute of the PCIJ, and accordingly the Statute of the ICJ whose relevant provisions are
identical. See Gordon, Legal Disputes, supra note 25, at 193 (discussing objections of, among
others, U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root's to the possibility of non-liquets by the PCIJ).
151. See Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 866 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Shahabuddeen).
152. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J. (set. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7) (holding that, in
the absence of a prohibitory rule of international law, Turkey could prosecute the captain of
a French ship that had collided with, and harmed persons on, a Turkish ship on the high seas).
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could establish the existence of a positive rule permitting their use.
Under this reading of the Lotus Case and the controlling presumption in
international law governing the application of the jus in bello to nuclear
weapons, paragraph 2.E would be read to prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons even in the most extreme case of self-defense.' 53
Others recognized the existence of ambiguity but felt unable to
resolve it or dismissed its significance. Judge Bedjaoui, whose casting
vote as President of the ICJ tipped the balance in favor of paragraph 2.E,
refused to follow Shahabuddeen's path out of the apparant non-liquet.
Bedjaoui conceded that international society, and thus its law, had
changed since the Lotus Case, so that it was no longer possible to apply
the received view of that case to resolve the gap with a presumption of
legality in the absence of a prohibitory rule.'54 On the other hand, he was
not prepared to agree with Shahabuddeen's argument that an anti-Lotus
presumption controlled; rather, because of "the uncertainties surrounding
the law and the facts," he concluded that, while the Lotus Case "gave the
green light of authorization, having found in international law no reason
for giving the red light of prohibition, the present Court does not feel
able to give a signal either way."' 55 Judge Vereschchetin also evaded
taking a position, acknowledging that the ICJ's opinion "indirectly admits
the existence of a 'grey area' in the present regulation" of nuclear
weapons. 5 6 But he argued that regardless of whether the ICJ was permit-
ted to declare a non-liquet in a contentious case, in an advisory opinion
the ICJ is "requested not to resolve an actual dispute between actual
Parties, but to state the law as it finds it at the present stage of its
development."' 15
7
That the ICJ's non-decision was a non-liquet was a distinctly minority
view. Judge Higgins deplored the dispositif, arguing:
153. See Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 902-03 (dissenting opinion
of Judge Weeramantry) (arguing that although the Lotus presumption states that a State is free
to act unless prohibited, its application is limited by the factual circumstances of the case
which did not involve war).
154. Id. at I.L.M. 1345-47 (declaration of President Bedjaoui). Bedjaoui argues that the
change in international society and law flowed not only from changes in positive law but also
in a transformation of the underlying conception of international law from a system of positive
rules into a normative order. As a result, the law is "the reflection of a collective juridical
conscience and ... a response to the social necessities of States organized as a community."
Id. at 1346.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 833 (declaration of Judge Vereshchetin).
157. ld Judge Vereshchetin cites the arguments of Stone and Siorat as support for the
prohibition on a declaration of non-liquet. See Stone, supra note 149; Siorat, supra note 149.
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That the formula chosen is a non-liquet cannot be doubted, because
the Court does not restrict itself to the inadequacy of the facts and
argument concerning the so-called "clean" and "precise" weapons.
.... The formula in the second part of paragraph 2.E refers also to
the "current state of international law" as the basis for the Court's
non-liquet.' 58
Yet, Judge Higgins's reasoning fails to grapple with the possibility that
if the Court had had sufficient "element of fact at its disposal," it might
have found "the current state of international law" adequate to meet the
challenge. This is surprising because Judge Higgins herself recognized
that it is "exactly the judicial function to take principles of general
application, to elaborate their meaning and to apply them to specific
situations."'' 59 Law is law, in other words, only in the sense that it gives
a precise meaning to specific set of facts-in other words, a holding.
60
Thus, an "adequate" statement of facts might not have required the ICJ
158. Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 937 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Higgins). It should be noted that the United Kingdom, Judge Higgins's country of nationality,
suggested in a written statement to the Court that in "the use of a low yield nuclear weapon
against warships on the High Seas or troops in sparsely populated areas, it is possible to
envisage a nuclear attack which cause[s] comparatively few civilian casualties." Id. at 829.
159. Id. at 937.
160. See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 33. Some U.S. State courts exercising statutorily-
created advisory opinion jurisdiction in response to certified questions from federal district
courts sitting with diversity jurisdiction have expressed similar wariness regarding the
adequacy of the factual basis for their rendering authoritative interpretations of state law. See
Western Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 630 (Or. 1991)
(stating that certification "is not appropriate if disputed facts make questions of law unclear");
In re Certified Question, 549 P.2d 1310 (Wyo. 1976) (holding that the Wyoming Supreme
Court will not answer a certified question unless nothing is left for the federal court to do but
apply the answer to the question and enter judgment); In re Richards, 223 A.2d 248 (Me.
1966) (refusing to answer a certified question because of uncertainly as to all the material facts
and the absence of specific finding of the federal district court that Maine law would be
determinative); see generally 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4248 (2d ed. 1988).
Arguably, the U.S. State court reticence to render advisory opinons when the factual
matrix is unsettled may simply flow from the predisposition of U.S. legal culture and the U.S.
constitution to engage in constitutional review only in the Marbury v. Madison "case and
controvery" mode. See generally Monaghan, supra note 139, at 11-14 (discussing theory of
constitutional review as incidental only to adjudication of private rights). However, similar
reticence can be found even in municipal legal systems, such as Canada's, that are quite
familiar with advisory opinon, or "reference," procedure. See James L. Huffman & MardiLyn
Saathoff, Advisory Opinions and Canadian Constitutional Development: The Supreme Court's
Reference Jurisdiction, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1251, 1270-73 (1990) (discussing cases evidencing
desire to avoid review in the abstract; citations omitted); see also id at 1277 n.159 (noting
that, under British law, the House of Lords was entitled to advisory opinions from the courts)
(citations omitted). It may be, therefore, that Judge Higgins' preference for fact-intensive
review even in the advisory opinion context reflects a cultural preference of lawyers educated
in common law legal systems.
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to "ramble through the wilds"' 61 of international law, allowing it instead
to narrow the question to one that could be answered given even the
"current state of international law." Indeed, the most productive advisory
opinions of the ICJ have drawn significant new general principles from
fact intensive cases.
62
Nonetheless, the ICJ stated it "[did] not consider that, in giving an
advisory opinion in the present case, it would necessarily have to write
'scenarios,' to study various types of nuclear weapons and to evaluate
highly complex and controversial technological, strategic and scientific
information. ' ,16' The concern seemed artificial especially in the case of
the request of the General Assembly; in order to fill the gap ostensibly
left by paragraph 2.E, it would not have been necessary for the ICJ to
engage in hypothetical reasoning because the Court certainly had avail-
able to it "elements of fact" sufficient for it to decide in at least one case
whether nuclear weapons could be used for self-defense in extremis.
Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion, for example, discusses the actual
case of the Gulf War, in which a coalition of States, acting pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 678's authorization for the use of "all neces-
sary means," forcibly ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and thus ensured
Kuwait's survival as a State."6 Judge Schwebel observed that, although
President Bush had privately ruled out the option of using nuclear
weapons in the conflict, U.S. Secretary of State Baker implied, and Iraqi
Foreign Miniser Tariq Aziz indeed inferred, a U.S. threat to use nuclear
weapons that deterred Iraqi's first use of weapons of mass destruction. 65
161. United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 610 n.10 (1972) (Justice Marshall's bon mot
on the perils of economic theory in antitrust analysis).
162. See generally Western Sahara (Morocco v. Spain), 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) (stimu-
lating transformations in the law of self-determination that have continued, with developments
in the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia and perhaps now even with East Timor); Legal
Consequences for States, supra note 64 (reshaping, among other things, international human
rights law, in the course of addressing specific factual claims regarding the Mandate to South
Africa and its performance of its legal obligations in Namibia); Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20) (affirming, in light of the refusal of certain states to pay for
the U.N. operation in the Congo, the U.N.'s power to establish and fund, peacekeeping opera-
tions, which until Resolution 678 and its successors, was the principal vehicle for the Council's
discharge of its responsibilities to maintain international peace and security); Reparations for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) (making clear
the legal personality of the U.N. and its organs in the context of a specific U.N. claim for
relief arising out of an attack against a U.N. officer, Count Bernadotte).
163. Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 819.
164. Id. at 840-41 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President Schwebel); S.C. Res. 678, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. para. 2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/678 (1990).
165. See Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 840-41 (dissenting opinion
of Vice-President Schwebel). Vice-President Schwebel concluded:
Thus there is on record remarkable evidence indicating than an aggressor was or
may have been deterred from using outlawed weapons of mass destruction against
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Furthermore, Judge Schwebel's comment that "the principles of the
United Nations Charter were sustained rather than transgressed by the
threat" suggests that he understood the legality of the threat to rest on the
authorization granted by the Security Council.'6
There were sound prudential reasons, however, for the ICJ not to
embark on this voyage of judicial discovery. If the Court had followed
Judge Schwebel's suggestion, it might well have had to pronounce on the
conduct of the United States, turning the case in effect into a contentious
proceeding and thereby implicating consideration underlying the Court's
abstention in Monetary Gold.67 In addition, the ICJ could not have been
indifferent to the turmoil caused by its last attempt in the Nicaragua
Case to pronounce upon the use of force by the United States. 
16
More important, the legal and factual issues in such an analysis
would have been exceedingly complex. Judge Schwebel did not, for
example, make the case that the Security Council specifically intended its
"all necessary means" formulation to authorize Coalition forces to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons if it were determined that such threat or
use would be "necessary" to liberate Kuwait and prevent its dissolution
as a State. He did, however, suggest what might have been an alternative
line of defense for the United States, noting that Security Council's
forces and countries arrayed against its aggression at the call of the United Nations
by what the aggressor perceived to be a threat to use nuclear weapons against it
should it first use weapons of mass destruction against the forces of the coalition.
ILd. at 842.
166. Judge Schwebel asked: "Can it seriously be maintained that Mr. Baker's calculat-
ed-and apparently successful--threat was unlawful? Surely the principles of the United
Nations Charter were sustained rather than transgressed by the threat." Id The reference to the
"principles" of the Charter should be read as an implicit admission that, in theory at least, the
Charter's principles and purposes, subject to the exception in Article 2(7)'s domestic jurisdic-
tion principle with respect to enforcement action, continue to operate to limit the Security
Council's power to make binding decisions. It may be significant in this context that Judge
Schwebel did not refer to customary international law as a limit that the Security Council's
powers may not transgress. The Court, by contrast, had observed that "fundamental rules [of
humanitarian law] are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the
conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of interna-
tional customary law." Id. at 827.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76. Article 68 of the Statute also provides:
"In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions
of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes
them to be applicable." STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 68.
168. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27) (deciding without the benefit of facts the U.S. might have presented concerning Nicaraguan
activities, because the U.S. withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and refused
to participate in the proceedings, that U.S. conduct violated international law); see generally
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 25 (varying opinions
on the continued utility of the Court and the U.S. decision to withdraw its acceptance of the
ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the Statute).
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adoption of Resolution 984 of April 11, 1995,69 which welcomed the so-
called positive security assurances of nuclear weapon States, implied that
the Council "accepted the possibility of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons, particularly to assist a non-nuclear weapon State that... 'is a
victim of an act of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in
which nuclear weapons are used.'" 70 Obviously, Schwebel was aware
that Resolution 678 and the alleged U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons
preceded the adoption of Security Resolution 984 (1995). But as to the
Security Council commitment with respect to the positive security
assurances of the nuclear-weapon States, Resolution 984 at a minimum
restates Security Council Resolution 255 (1968),' Tt which predated the
Gulf War. Accordingly, Schwebel's reference to Resolution 984 suggests
he believes Resolution 255 could be read in pari materia with Resolution
678 to authorized the threat or use of nuclear weapons to reverse Iraqi
aggression. Based on the legislative history of Resolution 984, the argu-
ment would seem to be even stronger in the case involving a Security
Council resolution adopted after Resolution 984 which authorizes the use
of "all necessary means" to address a Chapter VII situation.1 72 But even
if the legal theory were sustainable, Schwebel would still need to fully
make out the critical factual predicate of whether at the time of the Gulf
War the United States had sufficient reason to believe that Iraq had
acquired a nuclear weapons capability to warrant a threat to deter an
Iraqi first use.
173
169. See S.C. Res. 984, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/984 (1995).
170. Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 838 (dissenting opinion of Vice-
President Schwebel).
171. Compare S.C. Res. 984, supra note 169, with S.C. Res. 255, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/255 (1968).
172. Statements by at least some States, which criticized the Council's refusal to declare
in advance that a "threat or use of nuclear weapons" was a "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression" for purposes of authorizing the use of "all necessary means" by
Member States, could be construed to suggest that a retaliatory threat would be encompassed
by an "all necessary means" resolution. Iran, which as a victim of Iraq's use of weapons of
mass destruction had an interest in the Council's threatening to use nuclear weapons to deter
Iraq from such use, stated that "the Security Council should be prepared to use all necessary
means in defense of the victims [of aggression involving the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons] in accordance with the United Nations Charter." U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3514th
mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3514 (1995) (Statement of Iranian Representative, Ambassador
Kharrazi). Egypt, probably feeling equally threatened, argued that, where a "non-nuclear-
weapon State was the object of a nuclear attack or threat of an attack, [i]t is axiomatic that the
magnitude in the degree of devastation and destruction by nuclear weapons necessitates a
proportionate elevation of the Security Council's response." d at 11 (statement of Egyptian
Representative, Ambassador Elaraby).
173. See Jessica Mathews, Iraq's Nuclear Warning, WASHINGTON POST, July 16, 1991,
at A19 (discussing Iraq's acknowledgment of a nuclear weapons program); William Drozdiak,
U.S., France Back Force if Needed: Bush, Mitterrand Agree on Steps Aginst Iraq, WASHING-
TON POST, July 15, 1991, at Al (reporting President Bush as stating that there was uncontro-
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2. Separation of Powers and Federalism
In any event, a close reading of the ICJ's opinion suggests that the
Court may have refused to address this concrete case and the issues it
spawned, not because of the complexity of the relevant Security Council
resolutions and the concrete facts in which they were applied, but for
what might loosely be called international separation of powers and
federalism reasons. As to separation of powers, the Court was faced with
an apparent conflict between the Security Council and the General
Assembly. On one hand, while recognizing that "the Security Council
may take enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
Court did "not consider it necessary to address questions which might, in
a given case, arise from application of Chapter VII.',' 174 On the other
hand, while implicitly acknowledging law-making power in the General
Assembly,175 the ICJ determined that the relevant General Assembly
resolutions on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons failed
to establish the existence of a prohibitory rule.176 Refusing to accord
priority to the Assembly or the Council, the ICJ was noticeably silent
about Article 12 of the Charter, which provides that:
While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute
or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the
General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard
to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so
requests. 177
verted evidence that Hussein was lying about Iraq's nuclear capability); Patrick E. Tyler, Iraq
Nuclear Program Stirs Debate: Analysts Differ on Baghdad's Capability to Build Bomb,
WASHINGTON POST, June 4, 1989, at A35 (reporting different assessments concerning Iraq's
nuclear capabilities and potentials before the Gulf War).
174. Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 823. Admittedly, the Court also
said that "[a] weapon that is already unlawful per se, whether by treaty or custom, does not
become lawful by reason of its being used for a legitimate purpose under the Charter." Id. at
822. However, the Court did not find that nuclear weapons were unlawful per se, but rather
only "generally" so. See id. at 831.
175. After discussing the disarmament-related activities of the General Assembly, the
Court said that:
[T]he Charter cannot be read as limiting the ability of the Assembly to request an
opinion only in those circumstances in which it can take binding decisions. The fact
that the Assembly's activities in the above-mentioned field have led it only to the
making of recommendations thus has no bearing on the issue of whether it had the
competence to put to the Court the question of which it is seised.
Id at 817. Because the "above-mentioned field" was disarmament, the Court's suggestion that
its activities had "led it only to ... making recommendations" leaves open the possibility that,
if its activities had led it to making binding decisions, the General Assembly would have been
competent to do so.
176. See id. at 826.
177. U.N. CHARTER art. 12, para 1.
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This may be because whether the General Assembly's duty to refrain
from making recommendations is controlling, when the Security Council
through inaction is not "exercising ... the functions assigned to it",t78 for
"the maintenance of international peace and security,"' 9 has never been
authoritatively determined.180 In short, the Court suggested that, even
though both organs were free to legislate, neither had done so. Rather
than address the separation of powers conflict, the Court chose to dis-
solve it.
Similarly, the ICJ refrained from resolving the international federal-
ism issues posed by the conflict between, on one hand, the international
community's right not to permit the use of weapons that violate the
humanitarian law principles of discrimination and proportionality, and on
the other, a sovereign State's right to individual and collective self-
defense.'' While the Court did not itself refer to the Lotus problem,
Judge Fleischhauer's separate opinion explained why it should not now
be answered by legal analysis, given "the legal and moral difficulties of
the territory into which the Court has been led by the question asked of
it by the General Assembly" and the fact that international politics, in his
view, "have not yet produced a system of collective security of such
perfection that it could take care of the dilemma, swiftly and efficient-
ly.' 82 Judge Fleischhauer therefore concluded that "there is no rule of
international law according to which one of the conflicting principles
would prevail over the other."1 83 Indeed, he argued that recourse to
municipal law principles to redress the ambiguity of treaty and customary
178. Id.
179. Id at art. 24, para 1.
180. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Pt. 7, Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N.
Doc. A/1775 (1950) (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 3, 1950 in response to
the impasse at the Security Council over the Korean war). Paragraph A(l) of the Resolution
states that:
[i]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for
collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggres-
sion the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
Id.
181. See Jeremy Stone, Less Than Meets the Eye, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTIST, Sept./Oct.
1996, at 43, 44 (noting that the Court's formulation in paragraph 2.E refers to "a" State's
survival, permitting the State using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons to ensure the
survival of another State).
182. Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 835 (separate opinion of Judge
Fleischhauer).
183. Id.
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law would pose the same tension, for "no legal system is entitled to
demand the self-abandonment, the suicide, of one of its subjects."'' 4 The
President of the Court, Judge Bedjaoui, emphasized the other side of the
problem, observing "[iut would be quite foolhardy unhesitatingly to set
the survival of a State above all other considerations, in particular above
the survival of mankind itself."' 5 Thus, the debate between Judges
Fleischhauer and Bedjaoui identifies the central dilemma of the interna-
tional community: namely, whether a State's right to exist should trump
that State's duty to die for the sake of the international community.
3. Moral Questions and Political Answers
The presumption in the Lotus Case confirms the enduring signifi-
cance of State sovereignty, for States through their will constitute the
international community; yet, the possible contrary of the Lotus Case is
that States are constituted by the international community. 6 Could a
State, so long as it remained a State, ever give up its right to exist?
Under the contrary of the Lotus Case, could a State ever insist on its
right to survive at the price of destroying another State when its very
existence is by leave of the international community? Lotus and anti-
Lotus make a more engaging debate, however, if we substitute the word
"people" for "State." This is at core a question of constitutional dimen-
sion, implicating the U.N. Charter's simultaneous commitments to, on
one hand, "equality of rights and self-determination of peoples" and, on
the other, to "universal peace."'' 8 7 In other words, can there be an inter-
national "constitution" that retains "federal" qualities without preserving
an irreducible minimum of State autonomy?'88 Not surprisingly, Bickel
located the origins of his enterprise in the so-called "Lincolnian tension"
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1347 (declaration of President Bedjaoui).
186. The distinction arises in other contexts as well, for example in the debate between
the declaratory and constitutive theories of recognition. See H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-41 (1947). In that context as well, a move toward regarding States
as creatures of the international community rather than the international community as the
creature of States is manifest. See JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
7 (1987); Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the
Untied Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29 (1995); Marc Weller, The International Response
to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569
(1992).
187. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (including among the purposes of the United Nations
"friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strenghten universal
peace").
188. U.S. CONST. art. V (providing that the Senate cannot be abolished by an amendment
to the Constitution; thus, implicitly, entrenching state sovereignty as an irrevocable component
of American constitutionalism).
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between high principle and government by consent, which Abraham
Lincoln endured in leading the United States to its confrontation with the
question of how to reconcile its survival as a "federal" republic with the
continuation of an unjust order. 89
For the international order, the threat or use of nuclear weapons is
also inescapably a question of the enormous moral significance that
Judge Fleischhauer saw in the General Assembly's request. The problem
recalls Regina v. Dudley and Stevens, a 100 year-old English case, in
which the Court was asked to decide whether two seaman who murdered
a cabin boy and then ate him, when there was "no sail in sight, nor
reasonable prospect for relief," were criminally liable."9 The problem
sounds also in the classic hypothetical based on this case constructed by
Lon Fuller, concerning Speluncean explorers caught in a cave who
agreed to choose one of their number by lot to give up his own life so
that his remains would provide sustenance for the survivors until they
could be rescued.' 91 This hypothetical served as the material for imagined
judicial and academic opinions concerning whether to convict for murder,
and if so, whether to grant executive clemency to the men who killed
one of their number. The victim had been selected for death through the
method the parties had chosen-even though he had attempted to with-
draw from the agreement before the roll of the dice.' 92 Yet, Fuller also
supposed the men trapped in the cave had access to communications with
the outside world, and that they sought the counsel of officials of the
State, physicians and members of the clergy, but that no one was pre-
pared to give them more than technical advice concerning the likely time
they would be reached by rescuers and the probability of survival of
given numbers of men depending on the available nourishment.1
93
Perhaps the ICJ was equally sensible in refusing to give an answer to so
fundamental a question.94
189. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 68.
190. PETER W. Low ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 533, 534 (1982)
(quoting Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B. 273, 275 (1884)).
191. See Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REv. 616
(1949); reprinted in ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY 1 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1996).
192. See id. at 2-3.
193. See id. at 2.
194. In a sense, the Court's reaching out to interpret the NPT to require the abolition of
nuclear weapons, when that was not the question the Assembly asked, is also a clue to the
essentially moral nature of the Court's deliberations. Generally, the ICJ's conclusions-that
deterrence is conditionally permitted, that nuclear weapons' use would ordinarily violate rules
of discrimination and proportionality that constrain the use of force, but that the use of nuclear
weapons in an extreme case of self-defense cannot be ruled out-track the conclusions of
moral philosophers of the Catholic tradition, the Bishops of the American and French Catholic
Churches, who addressed these questions nearly fifteen years ago. See PASTORAL LETTER OF
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If, then, the ICJ's non-liquet was an exercise of its discretion not to
decide, it may explain Judge Vereshchetin statement-relying on Judge
Hersh Lauterpacht's receptivity, rather than Professor Lauterpacht's
resistence, to non-liquet t95-that "the case at hand presents a good exam-
ple of an instance when the absolute clarity of the opinion would be
deceptive and where on the other hand, its partial apparent indecision
may prove useful as a guide to action."'9' This would be consistent with
the ICJ's refusal to consider the relevance of jus cogens,197 which would
have had the effect of closing the doors to the political evolution of the
issue.
The apparent non-liquet in paragraph 2.E of the dispositif thus serves
purposes not dissimilar to those Bickel attributed to abstention on the
ground of vagueness; thus, a finding that it is impossible to say what the
law is on a given point is a restraint on delegation of the "power to make
decisions that do not derive from a prior legislative decision and that do
not, therefore, represent the sovereign will ... as it should be."'9 8 The
apparent non-iquet invites the political organs to discharge their own
"duty to decide" the fundamental questions that would need to be an-
swered to determine the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in a case
of self-defense.
The same might be said about the Court's gratuitous though unani-
mous conclusion, in paragraph 2.F of its dispositif, that the obligation
States have undertaken under Article VI of the NPT to "pursue in good
faith" negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament also includes an
THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS: 1975-1983, at 530-46 (Hugh Nolan ed., 1983)
(discussing reasons why reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence is not absolutely con-
demned); GAGNER LA PAIX, [French Catholic Bishops]. But see JOHN FINNIS ET AL., NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM 123-24 (1987) (rejecting the Bishops' prudential
judgments that deterrence is merely a bluff or that discriminate use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons in the current deterrence system is possible).
195. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT (1958). Lauterpacht's comment, published while he sat on the bench,
approving an "apparent indecision [of the ICJ], which leaves room for discretion on the part
of the organ which requested the opinion," id. at 152, might be contrasted with his earlier
academic writing in which he seems to have thought that the rule against non-liquets should
be applied as well to advisory opinions. See Lauterpacht, Non-Liquet, supra note 149, at 199;
compare Stone, supra note 149, at 128-29 n.7 (observing that Lauterpacht's analysis seems
predicated on the assumption, which Stone rejects, that advisory opinions are adversary in
nature and therefore do not differ radically from contentious cases) with Request of the
General Assembly, supra note 39, at 937 (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins) (describing
"the role of the International Court, whether in contentious proceedings or in its advisory
functions," to apply the law to specific situations).
196. Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 833 (declaration of Judge
Vereshchetin) (quoting Lauterpacht, supra note 195, at 152).
197. See Request of General Assembly, supra note 39, at 828.
198. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 151-52.
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obligation "to bring to a conclusion" those negotiations.' 99 This remark-
able statement, described as dictum by Judge Schwebel,m not only reads
words into the NPT that do not exist but seems to suppose that that
States believed it certain that they could achieve complete nuclear and
general disarmament. The ICJ's statement is plainly at odds with the
"good faith efforts" formulation the NPT parties chose, and the Court
failed to support its interpretation with references to the NPT's prepara-
tory work or the subsequent practice of the parties.2" Paragraph 2.F thus
recalls the ICJ's obiter dictum in the second New Zealand v. France
Nuclear Test Case concerning the relevance of international environment
law to underground nuclear testing.2°2 Yet, unlike that latter case, the ICJ
may have moved so far from the text of article VI of the NPT that its
heightened exposure to criticism for judicial lawmaking may well under-
cut the persuasiveness of the principles it articulated.23 On the other
hand, the World Court failed to hold that the obligation it read into
Article VI has as yet been breached, notwithstanding the failure of the
nuclear weapon States to bring into force START II and to negotiate
further reductions.
2°4
In any event, paragraphs 2.E and 2.F of the dispositif taken together
suggest that, not only in avoiding questions it could answer but also in
answering questions it was not asked, the Court seems to have been
199. Request of the General Assembly, supra note 39, at 831.
200. See id. at 842 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President Schwebel).
201. But see id. at 830-31 (citing a variety of arguably related prior and subsequent
international instruments; however, none treats the achievement of nuclear disarmament as
more than a "need" or "goal" of the international community).
202. See Underground Nuclear Test, supra note 117.
203. Abram Chayes has argued that "the authority of World Court decisions depend
ultimately upon their persuasive force." Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish
Justice?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1041 n.77 (1988) (citing Chayes, Nicaragua, the United
States and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445, 1481 (1985) (relying on BICKEL, supra
note 1)).
204. See John F Harris & Michael Dobbs, Clinton, Yeltsin to Meet in Helsinki: March
Summit Designed to Allay Russia's Fears Over NATO Expansion, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 8,
1997, at A17 (stating that the Russian legislature stalled ratification of START II treaty for the
past four years); Jessica Mathews, Putting Plutonium in Prison, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 4,
1997, at A15 (stating reasons why Russia is showing no interest in ratifying START II treaty);
R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Studies Deeper Nuclear Warhead Cuts: Possible START III Pact Could
Encourage Russia to Ratify 1993 Arms Reduction Treaty, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 23, 1997,
at A4 (U.S. proposals for new cuts to persuade Russian legislature to ratify START II treaty);
cf. Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Final Document (Part 1), U.N. NP7/Conf. 1995/32 (Part 1) (May 11, 1995),
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 959, 969-70 (1995) (committing the nuclear powers to enhanced
disarmament efforts); George Bunn, Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating Its Non-
Use Pledges?, ARMs CONTROL TODAY, May/June 1996, at 7 (arguing that U.S. pledges in
connection with the extension of the NPT, under international law, constitute legally binding,
rather than merely political, commitments of the U.S.).
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cognizant of its "grand" function of articulating principles that could
further prudential judgments by the political community. Indeed, if recent
evidence of efforts by former members of the nuclear weapons establish-
ments of the nuclear powers to encourage nuclear disarmament are to be
taken at face value,2°5 then the ICJ advisory opinion may well have given
new meaning to the expression "thinking the unthinkable."
CONCLUSIONS
Whether the ICJ's use of its "arsenal of devices" succeeds or fails, in
any particular case, to stimulate a process of democratic international
decisionmaking that achieves concrete results does not invalidate its
efforts. Yet, with time, Namibia became independent. With time, the
people of East Timor will find a way to exercise their right of self-
determination. And, with time, even the present system of deterrence will
give way. Even so, what matters instead is that the ICJ's participation in
the governance of the international community encourages political
participation in reasoned debate structured by principle. The ICJ's own
institutional survival may well depend on its occasional willingness to
exercise restraint. The judges of the ICJ are not elected directly by the
people of the world, though they can claim a modicum of democratic
legitimacy in their indirect election by the peoples of the world through
their election by the votes of the Security Council and General Assem-
bly,m many of whose members are now represented by democratically
elected governments. But institutional self-preservation is not the central
reason for abstention by the ICJ. Rather, for the Court to heed the call of
the passive virtues would serve far larger aims wherever restraint might
reasonably stimulate principled debate, thus improving the prospects for
confronting the important issues that face the world community at the
dawn of the next millennium. The world is now small enough that
meaningful transnational debate is possible. The ICJ's reliance on "the
205. See Mike Moore, A Boost for Abolition, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTIST, Nov./Dec. 1996,
at 38 (discussing the report of the Canberra Commission, a group of former government
officials and nuclear weapons experts calling for a specific set of steps toward nuclear disarma-
ment in the near future); see also Statement on the Reduction of Nuclear Arsenals by Gens.
Butler and Goodpaster and Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and
Admirals, ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Nov./Dec. 1996, at 15, 18; Steve Coil & David B. Ottaway,
Will the United States, Russia and China be Nuclear Partners or Rivals in the 21st Century?,
WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 11, 1995, at Al (reporting views of former head of U.S. Strategic
Air Command, General Lee Butler, favoring disarmament). But see Michael J. Matheson, The
Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 417, 434 (1997) (Principal Deputy Legal Advisor of the Department of State
arguing that the ICJ opinions do not call for any change in current U.S. policies).
206. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 4, para. 1.
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passive virtues" is no vice, so long as the Court remains within its pro-
dialogic role of furthering the global forum.
